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Yale Journal on Regulation 
Rory Van Loo
†
 
 
Despite the considerable attention paid to mandatory arbitration, few 
consumer disputes ever reach arbitration. By contrast, institutions such as 
Apple’s customer service department handle hundreds of millions of disputes 
annually. This Article argues that understanding businesses’ internal dispute 
processes is crucial to diagnosing consumers’ procedural needs. Moreover, 
businesses’ internal processes interact with a larger system of private actors. 
These actors include ratings websites that mete out reputational sanctions. The 
system also includes other corporations linked to the transaction, such as when 
American Express adjudicates a contested sale between a shopper and Home 
Depot. This vast private order offers promise to advance societal dispute 
resolution goals by providing large-scale redress and preserving relationships 
in ways that more formal institutions cannot. At the same time, businesses 
closely guard their internal processes as trade secrets. Out of public view, they 
are pushing the bounds of dispute resolution by, for example, considering 
factors such as a customer’s social network in deciding how to handle a 
complaint. If public intervention is needed, courts are at best only part of the 
solution. Instead, the frontier of consumer dispute resolution lies beyond 
arbitration and class actions in agency supervision of collaborative 
negotiations between consumers and corporations. 
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Introduction 
 
A vigorous debate is underway about privatization through mandatory 
arbitration. One group thinks that it is an efficient mode of dispute resolution.
1 
Another  group  believes  that  access  to  courts—particularly  to  aggregate 
litigation—is essential, and that corporations use mandatory arbitration to 
“erase” consumer rights.
2 
Although these discussions provide valuable insights, 
arbitrators rarely handle consumer disputes. By way of illustration, the 
American Arbitration Association—the leading non-profit provider of 
arbitration—adjudicates  fewer  than  1,500  consumer  cases  annually.
3   
In 
 
 
1. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1749 (2011) (“The 
point of affording parties discretion in designing arbitration processes is to allow for efficient, 
streamlined procedures tailored to the type of dispute.”). 
2. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of 
Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2811, 2893 (2015). 
3. See David Horton & Andrea Cann Chandrasekher,  After the Revolution:  An 
Empirical Study of Consumer Arbitration, 104 GEO. L.J. 57, 91 (2015) (finding 1,075 consumer cases 
annually are decided by the AAA). Companies also rarely use contract terms to customize public dispute 
resolution processes. See David A. Hoffman, Whither Bespoke Procedure?, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 389, 
394 (2014) (“[E]ven in circumstances where we would expect them to, parties almost never use contract 
terms to vary their post-dispute procedural contests.”). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2872096 
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contrast, the online marketplace eBay alone internally handles 60 million 
disputes each year between buyers and sellers.
4  
Comcast’s customer service 
department has over a million customer touch points each day.
5 
The main 
institutional actor in the private consumer legal system is not the arbitration 
tribunal, but the consumer-facing corporation.
6
 
Although legal scholars have written thousands of pages about arbitration 
in recent years, they have largely ignored businesses’ internal processes for 
resolving consumer disputes.
7 
Yet these unexamined processes are pushing the 
bounds of dispute resolution beyond anything seen in courts or arbitration. The 
result sometimes conflicts with traditional notions of justice. For example, 
Bank of America  recently  developed big  data  software  that considers the 
wealth of family members in deciding how to handle a customer’s request for a 
fee waiver.
8 
At the same time, new internal business processes are advancing 
societal goals in numerous ways, such as by making it ever more possible to 
obtain low-cost redress that preserves the relationship between the parties. 
Rolled out over hundreds of millions of disputes each year, the design of 
companies’ internal processes can influence efficiency, the distribution of 
wealth, and fairness on a massive scale. 
This Article’s main aim is to contribute an institutional account of how 
companies resolve the most common type of consumer dispute—small-value 
transactional disputes of a few hundred dollars or less.
9 
Scholars have produced 
 
 
 
4. See Louis F. Del Duca et al., Ebay’s De Facto Low Value High Volume Resolution 
Process: Lessons and Best Practices for ODR Systems Designers, 6 Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIATION 204, 
205 (2014) (reporting sixty million disputes handled by eBay annually). 
5. David Segal, When a Company Doesn’t Sound Like a Broken Record, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 11, 2014, at B5. 
6. Scholars have made a related broader point, arguing without quantifying the issue 
that there is a need to pay greater attention to organizations’ internal processes for handling a variety of 
disputes, such as those between employee and employer, citizen and government, and consumer and 
business. See, e.g., Laura Nader, Disputing Without the Force of Law, 88 YALE L.J. 998, 999-1000 
(1979) (noting that scholars seldom focus on complaints by citizens to corporations and government 
bureaucracies). 
7. Existing proposals  for public  intervention—which  mostly  focus  on  providing 
greater access to public courts, or regulating arbitration—do not speak to the question of how to shape 
corporations’ internal processes. These proposals often assume that “businesses can escape all 
accountability for causing small harms if they can escape class actions.” See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The 
End of Class Actions?, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 161, 166 (2015). See also Resnik, supra note 2, at 2921 
(exploring ways to allow public court review of arbitration); Nader, supra note 6, at 1000 (concluding 
“access to the legal system is crucial if extralegal processes are ever to provide effective relief for 
consumer and citizen complaints.”). 
8. See U.S. Patent No. 7797212 (filed Oct 31, 2006), 
http://www.google.com/patents/US7797212 (describing Bank of America’s automated refund tool). 
9. The average consumer transaction is for less than $100. See FED. RESERVE, 2013 
FEDERAL RESERVE PAYMENTS STUDY (Dec. 19, 2013), 
https://www.frbservices.org/files/communications/pdf/research/2013_payments_study_summary.pdf,        at 
Exhibit 2 (estimating the average transaction value in 2012 at $94 for credit cards and $39 for debit 
cards); Barbara Bennett et al., Cash Continues To Play a Key Role in Consumer Spending: Evidence 
from   the   Diary   of   Consumer   Payment   Choice,   FED.   RES.   BANK   OF   S.F.   (April   2014), 
http://www.frbsf.org/cash/publications/fed-notes/2014/april/cash-consumer-spending-payment-diary 
(reporting the average amount of a cash consumer transaction as $21). Disputes are more likely to be 
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in-depth institutional analyses of related internal corporate dispute resolution, 
such as in employment proceedings
10 
and tort settlement.
11 
The literature lacks 
anything similar for small-value transactional disputes. For these, unlike in 
contexts typically studied, the corporation is the closest thing to a courthouse 
that most consumers will encounter—although just how close depends on the 
context.
12
 
Scholars have produced analyses valuable to this project. For example, 
they have discussed how the ultimate outcome of the consumer-business 
dispute often deviates from the contract.
13 
This particular feature fits into a 
broader contract law theory of the customer service department as a site of 
displaced bargaining about the less salient terms of adhesive contracts—a kind 
of modern “analog to the village market . . . adapted to the needs of a mass- 
contracting age.”
14 
Instead of inefficiently requiring the vast majority of parties 
 
 
initiated for higher transaction values, but even so the typical amount in dispute is low. For example, 
eBay’s 60 million annual disputes are for an average of $70 to $100 in value. See Del Duca et al., supra 
note 4, at 205. This is only slightly higher than the estimated average transaction at eBay of about $55 in 
2013. See Sumit Roy, Average Selling Price of Merchandise on eBay, ONLINE MARKETING TRENDS 
(March    2011),    http://www.onlinemarketing-trends.com/2011/03/average-selling-price-of-merchandise 
-on.html. Myriam Gilles and Gary Friedman have in an analogous context asserted that consumer cases 
include those in banking and insurance, but exclude “employment, antitrust, and securities actions, and 
virtually all mass tort class actions.” See Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class 
Action Agency Costs Myth: The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 104 
n.5 (2006). 
10. See, e.g., Lauren B. Edelman & Mark C. Suchman, When the “Haves” Hold 
Court: Speculations on the Organizational Internalization of Law, 33 L. & SOC’Y REV. 941, 944 (1999) 
(focusing on employment law in discussing how organizations internalize legal disputes). 
11. See, e.g., Nora Freeman Engstrom, Sunlight and Settlement Mills, 86 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 805, 805 (2011); Dana A. Remus & Adam S. Zimmerman, The Corporate Settlement Mill, 101 
VA. L. REV. 129, 130 (2015). 
12. The metaphor of the corporation as courthouse fits better with some of its dispute 
resolution roles than others. For example, the processes in which one business is adjudicating a dispute 
between another business and a consumer more closely approximates a public trial than does the 
customer service department handling a complaint. However, even in the customer service department, 
business designers aim to create the perception of procedural justice and a neutral decision maker. Thus, 
analyses traditionally reserved for institutions such as public courts may be more relevant than 
commonly assumed. See infra Part I. 
13. See Lisa Bernstein & Hagay Volvovsky, Comment on the Work of Florencia 
Marotta-Wurgler: Not What You Wanted To Know: The Real Deal and the Paper Deal in Consumer 
Contracts, 11 JERUSALEM REV. L. STUD. 1-4 (forthcoming, 2016) (arguing for greater attention to the 
substantive deal consumers actually get rather than focusing solely on the terms of the contract, which 
companies often ignore in the “real deal”); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Are ‘Pay Now, Terms Later’ 
Contracts Worse for Buyers? Evidence from Software License Agreements, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 309, 309 
(2009) (finding that software publishers who reveal dispute resolution terms later offer no more one- 
sided terms than those who reveal the terms in advance); Nader, supra note 6, at 1012-14 (describing the 
consumer complaint process as manipulating consumers but generally giving persistent consumers what 
they request); Amy J. Schmitz, Access to Consumer Remedies in the Squeaky Wheel System, 39 PEPP. L. 
REV. 279 (2012) (concluding that corporations who violate the law use their customer service 
departments to appease consumers who complain for the strategic purpose of being able to continue 
violating other consumers’ rights); Jason Scott Johnston, The Return of Bargain: An Economic Theory 
of How Standard-Form Contracts Enable Cooperative Negotiation Between Businesses and Consumers, 
104  MICH. L. REV. 857,  865  (2006)  (concluding  corporations’  cooperation  with  consumers  who 
complain can be viewed as efficient). 
14. See DANIEL MARKOVITS, CONTRACT LAW AND LEGAL METHODS 1316-19 (2012) 
(describing  customer  service  department  interactions  with  consumers  over  contractual  matters  as 
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who will never have a dispute to negotiate about each term before the initial 
transaction is completed, these processes theoretically allow consumers and 
corporations to negotiate about those terms only as necessary when a dispute 
arises.
15
 
This Article builds on that literature to describe a more comprehensive 
dispute system for consumers.
16 
In this largely private order, the corporation 
plays three key dispute resolution roles. The first is the customer service 
department handling disputes about its own products. The literature has not 
only failed to grasp the scale of this institution, but has yet to identify important 
design features. For example, corporations are increasingly finding ways to 
associate their customer service departments with components of procedural 
justice that legal scholars have long identified as important for legitimacy 
elsewhere, such as for law enforcement. These include ensuring people feel like 
they have a voice, are treated with respect, and have their disputes handled by a 
trustworthy decision maker.
17
 
The second main dispute resolution role is largely absent from the 
literature: when the corporation serves as a judge for disputes between its own 
consumers and independent, third-party sellers. These network trials have 
exploded in recent years due to both financial and online intermediation. In the 
financial context, between fifty million and one hundred million times each 
year credit card companies such as American Express adjudicate disputes 
between a consumer and the merchant who sold the product, such as Home 
Depot or Walmart.
18  
Also, Internet companies such as eBay, Amazon, and 
Uber increasingly adjudicate disputes between buyers and sellers or between 
drivers  and  passengers.
19   
Because  this  form  of  adjudication  involves  an 
 
 
 
“displaced bargaining”). In a related strand of scholarship about business deals, Stewart Macaulay and 
others have argued that the contract often does not reflect the actual terms of an agreement. See, e.g., 
Stewart Macaulay, An Empirical View of Contract, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 465, 467 (1985). 
15. See Johnston, supra note 13, at 865. According to this view, courts should 
approach customer service department interactions as negotiations about what the contract terms should 
be rather than disputes about what the contract terms are. See MARKOVITS, supra note 14, at 1319. 
16. A system can be seen as a series of interlocking processes. See NANCY H. 
ROGERS ET AL., DESIGNING SYSTEMS AND PROCESSES FOR MANAGING DISPUTES 3 (2013). 
17. See infra section I.B.2. These elements have been found to matter more than 
substantive outcomes for peoples’ perception of authorities’ legitimacy in other legal contexts, such as 
in criminal law. See TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006). 
18. See,  e.g.,  SUMIT   SOOD  &  JOSEPH   PINIPE,  WIPRO,  CARD  DISPUTES   AND 
CHARGEBACKS 5, https://www.wipro.com/documents/card-disputes-and-chargebacks.pdf (describing a 
chargeback  band  between  .05  and  .1  percent  of  all  transactions  as  “a  conservative  range.”).  A 
chargeback rate of .05% to .1% would amount to 50 million to 100 million chargebacks requested 
annually. See FED. RES. SYSTEM, THE 2013 FEDERAL RESERVE PAYMENTS STUDY, at Exhibits 4, 8, 10, 
(Dec.  19, 2013), 
https://www.frbservices.org/files/communications/pdf/research/2013_payments_study_summary.pdf 
(estimating 122.8 billion noncash payments in 2012, excluding wire transfers and checks, the vast 
majority of which are consumer transactions). A large portion of these are fraud-related (unauthorized 
use of credit card). See id. 
19. See supra note 4; Colin Rule, Quantifying the Economic Benefits of Effective 
Redress: Large E-Commerce Data Sets and the Cost-Benefit Case for Investing in Dispute Resolution, 
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intermediary with an interest in preserving the relationship with both sides, it 
raises a distinct set of questions from  those raised by arbitration and the 
traditional customer service department.
20
 
The corporation plays a third key dispute resolution role as a reputation- 
based enforcement mechanism. Legal scholars have in a number of contexts, 
such as among diamond merchants or Shasta County cattle ranchers, 
documented how reputation sanctions enable the establishment of private 
orders.
21 
In those contexts, any party who violates a norm suffers such harmful 
reputational damage from gossip networks or other social ties that 
transgressions rarely occur, and more formal enforcement mechanisms are 
seldom used.
22 
The literature lacks any such systems analysis for consumer 
disputes, which are assumed to work differently due to a larger sophistication 
imbalance between consumers and corporations, and due to more distant 
relationships, which make reputation-based sanctions less powerful.
23 
However, in the consumer context information websites are filling the 
enforcement role that gossip networks and social ties play in commerce 
between businesses. When dissatisfied, consumers today can reach large 
audiences through outlets such as Twitter, Facebook, Yelp, and Ripoff 
Report.
24
 
 
 
 
34 U. ARK. LITTLE  ROCK  L. REV. 767, 767 (2012) (describing eBay and PayPal’s online dispute 
system). 
20. See infra section I.C. 
21. See Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating 
Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1762 (2001) (“[T]o fully 
understand the reasons that the industry has found it advantageous to opt out of the legal system, it is 
useful to consider how the system as a whole is structured to create the conditions under which 
cooperative contracting relationships are most likely to arise and endure.”) [hereinafter Bernstein, 
Cotton Industry]; Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in 
the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 126 (1992) (examining the “dispute resolution system in 
the diamond industry. . .”) [hereinafter Bernstein, Diamond Industry]; Lisa Bernstein, Beyond Relational 
Contracts: Social Capital and Network Governance in Procurement Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
(Winter 2015) (concluding that large industrial buyers have “structured their relationships with their 
suppliers in ways that are designed . . . to make the legal system largely irrelevant to their interactions.”) 
[hereinafter Bernstein, Procurement Contracts]; Robert Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute 
Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623, 677 (1986) (finding that when 
wandering cattle damage land, ranchers and farmers neglect the remedies provided by trespass law and 
instead resolve disputes in accordance with neighborliness.). But see Barak Richman, An Autopsy of 
Cooperation: Diamond Dealers and the Limits of Trust-Based Exchange, at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2764470 (unpublished manuscript) (documenting a 
breakdown of trust in the diamond industry). 
22. See, e.g., Bernstein, Cotton Industry, supra note 21, at 1724-25, 1751-52 
(discussing the importance of information intermediaries, trade associations, gossip networks, and social 
ties in the cotton industry). 
23. See, e.g., Schmitz, supra note 13, at 283 (contrasting the balanced sophistication 
in business-to-business contexts with consumers’ lack of understanding in consumer contexts). Some 
scholars have recognized the potential for reputation websites to improve markets and protect 
consumers. See, e.g., Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an Era of Ubiquitous Personal 
Information, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1667, 1709 (2008) (“Imagine if every plumber, every manufactured 
product . . . and every taxi driver was rated . . . .”). However, scholars have understudied the link to the 
private consumer legal system. 
24. See infra section I.C. 
7 
Rory Van Loo, The Corporation as Courthouse, 33 YALE J. REG. 547 (2016). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thus, to understand privatized dispute resolution, it is important to go 
beyond individual mechanisms such as arbitration. The corporation’s various 
roles—including as site of contractual renegotiation, network judge, and 
reputation enforcer—provide the backbone for a private consumer dispute 
system. Because the literature lacks a comprehensive account of this system’s 
features, it necessarily lacks a comprehensive assessment of its promises and 
pitfalls. The more promising aspects are low-cost access to redress, direct 
accountability, and collaborative dispute resolution. Its pitfalls include a lack of 
transparency, the potential to exacerbate inequality, and susceptibility to market 
failures. 
These promises and pitfalls raise the question of what reforms, if any, are 
needed. Existing proposals to reform consumer dispute resolution focus on 
arbitration or courts. This Article’s analysis indicates an important possibility is 
missing from those conversations: administrative agency regulation of 
businesses’ dispute functions. Unlike most proposals, this approach emphasizes 
consumer-facing companies as the core institutional actors, and then asks how 
best to improve them. Companies must continue to play a central dispute 
resolution role because it would simply be impractical for courts or arbitrators 
to handle hundreds of millions of small value contractual consumer disputes 
annually—and particularly at the low costs at which dispute resolution becomes 
feasible for small-value claims.
25
 
The   inevitability   of   mass   internal   corporate   dispute   resolution 
distinguishes this Article’s focus from much of the rich literature arguing either 
for alternative dispute resolution or “against settlement.”
26 
Those conversations 
largely address contexts in which cases would otherwise be handled in courts, 
which raises distinct issues such as the erosion of the substantive law.
27 
For 
small-value contractual disputes, consumers and corporations rarely bargain in 
the shadow of the law in the first place.
28 
Instead, they largely bargain in the 
shadow of norms.
29
 
 
 
 
 
25. See infra section III.A. The best hope for courts or arbitration-like entities 
handling small-value contractual disputes would be through some form of online dispute resolution. See, 
e.g., Schmitz, supra note 19, at 325 (calling on policy makers to create an online dispute resolution 
processes for consumer claims). By introducing an additional intermediary, online dispute resolution 
would still risk undermining some important features of the existing system, such as the greater 
efficiency possible by not introducing an additional third party. 
26. See, e.g., Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984) (arguing 
against those who seek to promote settlement over adjudication). 
27. See J. Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law, 
124 YALE L.J. 3052, 3052 (2015) (arguing that the rise of arbitration has deprived the legal system of 
cases crucial for developing the law). 
28. Although the law has a small impact on most small value contractual disputes, the 
analysis varies by industry. Both the law and intermediary dispute resolution institutions may play a 
more important role in shaping consumer-business disputes in some industries, such as insurance. See 
Shauhin Talesh, Rule-Intermediaries in Action: How State and Business Stakeholders Influence the 
Meaning of Consumer Rights in Regulatory Governance Arrangements, 37 L. & POL’Y 1 (2015). The 
shadow of the law metaphor comes from Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the 
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Another key component of this policy implication is that the consumer 
agency plays the central public role. Instead of using the blunt instrument of 
public courts, agencies can leverage economic expertise and industry-specific 
knowledge to tailor intervention. They can also do so more efficiently. 
Agencies are thus best situated to address the current system’s pitfalls while 
preserving its benefits. 
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I draws on new and existing 
empirical data to explain the major design features of business-consumer 
dispute processes.
30 
These features include cooperative settlement, procedural 
justice, tailored outcomes, and procedural experimentalism. Part II examines 
the promises and pitfalls of the corporation as courthouse, many of which vary 
by market. Part III then assesses the current public backdrop for the private 
consumer legal system. Consumer agencies play the most important public role, 
and they have significant benefits compared to courts. Yet heavy reliance on 
regulation also brings risks. Part IV discusses policy implications. Because 
corporations’ dispute processes are so important to consumer justice, yet so 
little is known about how decisions are made, regulators should stay informed 
about those processes. Also, given that regulatory inadequacies and market 
failures are perhaps unavoidable in some industries, society might benefit from 
tailored class actions that become available only when other mechanisms fail— 
a kind of “sunrise class action.”
31
 
 
 
I. Overview of the Corporation as Courthouse 
 
Corporations are increasingly assuming roles associated with courthouses. 
They design procedures and shape the de facto substantive rules governing the 
vast majority of consumer disputes. In many instances they adjudicate these 
disputes as third parties. Just as Frank Sander articulated a public multi-door 
courthouse with litigation as one of many paths to dispute resolution, the web 
 
 
 
Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE  L.J. 950, 997 (1979) (concluding that legal 
entitlements substantially affect negotiated outcomes). 
29. These norms are enforced by market mechanisms, including reputation-based 
sanctions. See infra Part I.D. & II.A.4. This does not mean the law is irrelevant. The law and the 
possibility that regulators might enforce it can still influence businesses’ conduct. See infra Part III.A. 
30. New information was gained from interviews, patents filed by companies 
documenting their dispute processes, and complaints filed by consumers on the Internet. Thirty-seven 
interviews were conducted of current and former employees in consumer corporations, federal consumer 
agencies, consulting firms, and private sector dispute resolution professionals. The interviewees were 
selected using snowball sampling. This method may lead to interviews reflecting unrepresentative 
views. Also, as with any interview, these sources are susceptible to limited memory and any number of 
biases. Actual initials are used when permission was given, and initials are used to preserve 
confidentiality. Additional sources include online consumer reviews, empirical studies of complaint 
departments, court documents of cases related to complaint handling, and interviews reported in the 
media. 
31. See text accompanying note 329. 
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of consumer corporations also offer many paths.
32 
This Part provides an 
institutional analysis of these overlooked internal processes that account for 
such a large part of everyday consumer justice. 
 
A. The Marketplace for Dispute Resolution 
 
Executives pay close attention to the law when designing products and 
services, and strive to write adhesive contracts in their favor.
33 
However, once a 
consumer calls to complain, the corporation assumes that the consumer has no 
credible legal claim.
34 
From that point on, complaint decisions are made based 
on maximizing profit (or minimizing loss).
35 
Thus, the design and execution of 
corporations’ internal complaint systems are largely disconnected from legal 
rights. 
In many  markets, this  corporate  profit analysis  is driving  a  business 
paradigm shift toward building dispute processes that satisfy customers. 
Customer satisfaction has long been linked to financial performance.
36 
Many 
scholars have also  concluded  that how  a company  handles its complaints 
influences overall customer satisfaction.
37 
This indirect support suggesting that 
effective complaint handling is profitable has in recent years led to findings that 
a firm’s complaint handling directly predicts profitability and stock 
performance.
38 
Although it is difficult to isolate why effective complaint- 
handling might be so profitable, the research suggests that retaining customers 
and promoting word of mouth are both important.
39
 
 
 
32. See, e.g., Robert C. Bordone, Fitting the Ethics to the Forum: A Proposal for 
Process-Enabling Ethical Codes, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1 (2005) (discussing Frank Sander’s 
proposal of a multi-door courthouse, which includes conciliation, mediation and arbitration among other 
options). The metaphor of the corporation as courthouse has a similarly expansive view of what a 
courthouse may offer to society. 
33. See, e.g., Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & Robert Taylor, Set in Stone? Change and 
Innovation in Consumer Standard-Form Contracts, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV 240, 240 (2013) (empirically 
finding that the average software contract became more pro-seller between 2003 and 2010). 
34. Interview with N.B. (June 12, 2015) (former customer service executive of large 
bank describing approach to handling customer complaints). 
35. See, e.g., Merlin Stone, Literature Review on Complaints Management, 18 J. 
DATABASE MARKETING. & CUSTOMER STRATEGY MGMT. 108, 117 (2011). 
36. See Xueming Luo and Christian Homburg, Satisfaction, Complaint, and the Stock 
Value Gap, 72 J. MARKETING. 29, 29 (2013) (reviewing the literature suggesting customer satisfaction is 
linked to companies’ cash flows, the ratio of market value to replacement value of assets, and excess 
stock return). 
37. See, e.g., Christian Homburg & Andreas Furst, How Organizational Complaint 
Handling Drives Customer Loyalty: An Analysis of the Mechanistic and the Organic Approach, 69 J. 
MARKETING, 95, 96-97 (2005); Stone, supra note 35, at 113 (concluding it is not the original service 
failure that most determines overall dissatisfaction, but how the company handles the dispute once the 
failure has arisen). 
38. See, e.g., Homburg & Furst, supra note 37, at 95 (citing studies indicating that the 
return on investment for complaint management can be above 100%); Luo & Homburg, supra note 36, 
at 41 (“A direct implication of our study is that though retaining satisfied customers is critical, handling 
complaining customers may help even more in optimizing firms’ stock value.”). 
39. See Stone, supra note 35, at 112-13 (discussing data suggesting poor service and 
handling of problems explains half of customer switching to competitors and noting customers respond 
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This literature has led a chorus of academics and consultants to urge 
businesses to increase profits by improving their complaint-handling processes. 
McKinsey & Co., which advises many of the world’s largest consumer 
corporations, has broadly concluded that its clients financially benefit from 
prioritizing customers’ problems over what seem to be the immediate sales 
interests of the firm.
40 
Businesses are changing their behavior accordingly.
41 
eBay, a rare company that has shared the results of such changed behavior 
publicly, found that effective dispute resolution drove repeat customer 
business.
42
 
The strong empirical case for designing internal grievance processes, and 
the evidence of large-scale monetary investment in those processes, contradicts 
what millions of consumers experience every day: complaining to a corporation 
is often frustrating.
43 
Sixty-eight percent of households experienced customer 
rage in a recent one-year period.
44 
While some dissatisfaction is inevitable, the 
consensus among academics and industry experts is that companies often do a 
poor job of resolving disputes.
45 
By some measures, companies do not resolve 
disputes effectively half of the time.
46
 
How are these two perspectives reconciled? Some commentators have 
concluded that companies design dispute processes to ensure that consumers 
must work hard to obtain redress, such as by purposefully institutionalizing 
delays, or constructing “good-cop bad-cop” routines.
47  
To be sure, in certain 
 
 
 
 
 
to dissatisfaction with complaint handling by negative word-of-mouth); Mohammad Faryabi et al., The 
Relationship Continuity Model and Customer Loyalty in The Banking Industry: A Case Study of the 
Maskan Bank of Iran, 14 J. RELATIONSHIP MARKETING 37 (2015) (using a hierarchical regression model 
to conclude customer continuity is related to conflict resolution). 
40. Marc Beaujean et al., The ‘Moment of Truth’ in Customer Service, MCKINSEY Q., 
Feb. 2006 (finding that after a positive dispute resolution experience 85 percent of consumers spent 
more at the company, while after a negative experience 70 percent spent less). See also Luo & 
Homburg, supra note 36, at 42 (recommending based on empirical research that companies establish 
“[a] companywide financial and strategic environment” that promotes consumer satisfaction in 
complaint handling). 
41. Christine Crandell, Customer Experience: Is It The Chicken or Egg?, FORBES 
(Jan.   21,   2013),   http://www.forbes.com/sites/christinecrandell/2013/01/21/customer-experience-is-it-the 
-chicken-or-egg (“Companies are starting to see the light. They are embracing [customer experience as a 
competitive  differentiator].”) 
42. See Rule,  supra note 19, at  767 (“These results . . .  offer hard evidence of 
economic benefits that can be gleaned from . . . effective redress processes.”). 
43. See DEBBIE FREEMAN, New Customer-Rage Study Out for Holiday Shopping 
Season, ARIZ. ST. U., (Nov. 26, 2013), https://wpcarey.asu.edu/news-releases/2013-11-26/new 
-customer-rage-study-out-holiday-shopping-season (finding widespread customer “rage”). 
44. See id. 
45. Homburg & Furst, supra note 37, at 95 (reviewing the literature and concluding 
that “[t]here is ample evidence that many companies do not handle complaints effectively.”). 
46. See Hooman Estelami, Competitive and Procedural Determinants of Delight and 
Disappointment in Consumer Complaint Outcomes, 2 J. SERV. RES. 285, 287 (2000). 
47. See, e.g., Schmitz, supra note 13, at 289. 
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industries, such as concentrated cable and Internet markets that leave 
consumers few options, customer satisfaction may matter less.
48
 
However, the purposeful creation of frustrating or unfair complaint 
processes is likely exaggerated. Quite often dissatisfaction with complaint 
handling may simply be due to two underappreciated factors: the propriety of 
the company’s actions or corporate incompetence. Consumers sometimes 
complain about practices that are not only legal, but conform to most 
consumers’ sense of fairness.
49 
The existence of frustrated consumers does not 
always mean that there has been improper complaint handling. 
Incompetence in corporations begins with inept profitability analyses of 
complaint management.
50 
A focus on short-term revenues, rather than on the 
lifetime value of the customer, causes many firms to underemphasize the 
solving  of  customers’  problems.
51   
Modern  corporations  are  so  large,  and 
dispute resolution is so complicated, that creating effective processes can 
require a level of skill and resources akin to launching a new brand.
52 
While the 
costs associated with dispute resolution—such as for employee salaries, 
information technologies, and consumer refunds—are immediate budget line 
items, the revenues from customer retention and avoiding negative word-of- 
mouth are blended into general revenues over a longer time horizon.
53 
The 
benefits of dispute resolution are thus less salient than the costs. This 
complicates internal advocacy efforts by customer service professionals—who 
are  only  one  of  many  internal-to-the-firm  interest  groups—to  obtain  the 
necessary leadership buy-in. 
Moreover, even when executives are fully aware, designing dispute 
systems is challenging.
54 
And even if the design is flawless, complaint handling 
requires subtle front-line and managerial interpersonal skills and support that 
are  not  readily  found  or  taught.
55   
Like  any  product  launch,  despite  the 
 
 
 
 
48. A monopolist does, however, have an incentive to maximize value to consumers 
in order to get the greatest surplus from which to extract monopoly rent. See infra Part II.B.4. 
49. See, e.g., Katherine Porter, The Complaint Conundrum: Thoughts on the CFPB 
Complaint Mechanism, 7 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 57, 78 (2012) (“Dissatisfied consumers can 
be widespread in lawful industries . . . .”). 
50. See Torben Hansen et al., Managing Consumer Complaints: Differences and 
Similarities Among Heterogeneous Retailers, 38 INT’L J. RETAIL & DISTRIBUTION MGMT. 6, 9 (2010). 
51. Beaujean et al., supra note 40. 
52. See Hansen et al., supra note 50, at 9. 
53. See Don Charlett et al., How Damaging Is Negative Word of Mouth?, 6 
MARKETING BULL. 42 (1995) (concluding managers underestimate the costs of negative word-of 
-mouth). 
54. See Stone, supra note 35, at 113-14 (“Even the best service organizations will 
find it hard to provide highly effective recoveries for every service failure.”). 
55. Beaujean et al., supra note 40 (discussing how one bank found that an important 
driver of its underperforming branches was frontline employees’ ineffective problem-solving); Hansen 
et al., supra note 50, at 9; Christine James, Confessions of a Fortune 500 Customer Service Rep, 
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organization’s best efforts, dispute resolution initiatives may fall short of their 
targets. 
It is thus important to divorce incompetence from intention. If companies 
are in the midst of a paradigm shift with respect to complaint resolution, 
corporations would be expected to head toward more consumer-friendly 
systems as awareness grows and as they undertake the often slow and difficult 
task of organizational change.
56 
A review of the systems being designed inside 
corporations, discussed in the following section, suggests this shift is occurring 
in many markets. 
 
B. Design Features of Internal Processes 
 
The strong empirical link between complaint resolution and profits has 
prompted companies to invest increasingly in resolving disputes.
57 
Although 
practices inevitably vary across industries and institutions,
58 
it is possible to 
identify some general features. 
 
1. Settlement over Adjudication 
 
As in business-to-business private legal systems,
59 
few consumer disputes 
are ever litigated or ever involve lawyers. Corporations instead handle disputes 
through settlement. Settlement is preferable to formal adjudication—such as 
arbitration or litigation—because it leads to higher satisfaction and costs less.
60
 
Companies promote settlement both substantively and procedurally. 
Substantively, companies facilitate settlement by negotiating the contractual 
relationship rather than by attempting to enforce their contractual rights.
61 
In a 
 
 
 
-service-rep-christine-james (quoting a Fortune 500 customer service representative as saying some 
representatives “[c]are but they are in the minority . . . . If you want to cancel I will try to save you, but 
only because it’s my job.”). 
56. Competition would be expected to “provide a stimulus to improve the quality of 
judicial services offered.” See Jens Dammann & Henry Hansmann, Globalizing Commercial Litigation, 
94 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 12 (2008) (proposing in an analogous context “a global market for judicial 
services in contract litigation.”). 
57. See, e.g., Crandell, supra note 41 (noting that companies are becoming aware that 
improving customers’ experiences pays off). 
58. See Hansen et al., supra note 50, at 6. 
59. See, e.g., Bernstein, Diamond Industry, supra note 21, at 115. 
60. The average up-front costs to consumers are about $100 for claims of less than 
$10,000. See Rule, supra note 19, at 776 (concluding buyers were more likely to shop after reaching a 
less favorable but amicable settlement than when they won a full refund through eBay’s adjudication); 
Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, An Empirical Study of AAA Consumer Arbitration, 25 
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 843, 843 (2010) (finding average costs to consumers of $100 in 
arbitration). More broadly, the law also encourages settlement in commercial contexts. The Uniform 
Commercial Code, for example, promotes settlements and compromise. See Macaulay, supra note 14, at 
469. 
61. Daniel Markovits has argued customer service departments are better theorized as 
a negotiation-based rather than adjudication-based model of customer service. See MARKOVITS, supra 
note 14, at 1317-1320. 
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variety of industries, businesses regularly ignore their strong legal position and 
make  concessions  to  which  the  consumer  is  not  legally  entitled.
62   
Every 
Hampton Inn employee can grant one free stay per complaint, while the Ritz- 
Carlton permits every employee to spend $2,000 to satisfy a guest.
63 
Close to 
nine out of ten consumers who asked their credit card company for a fee waiver 
after a late payment received it, even though the issuer is contractually entitled 
to collect.
64
 
Procedurally, corporations promote settlement by seeking to enable the 
consumer to complain easily through a variety of channels. Consumers have 
numerous direct entry points: calling, chatting online, emailing executives, or 
visiting a physical branch. In recent years, companies have expanded 
consumers’ ease of access to the settlement process by developing social media 
departments.  Resolution  specialists  in  these  departments  monitor  various 
websites such as Twitter and Yelp, and directly reach out to discontented 
consumers.
65
 
Wherever the consumer interfaces—whether in the legal department, the 
corporation’s ombud, or elsewhere—the overriding goal is to turn the 
complaint into a collaborative discussion. For example, after purchasing an 
item from Amazon, if a disgruntled consumer clicks on one star out of five, 
instead of that negative rating being submitted immediately, a link appears 
saying, “Please click here to contact the seller to resolve any problems with 
your order before leaving feedback.”
66 
Amazon also reminds the consumer of 
the possibility of simply returning the item.
67 
Using similar automated 
processes, eBay resolves 90% of submitted disputes without ever involving any 
 
 
 
 
 
62. See Johnston, supra note 13, at 865 (“Typically, the firm’s standard-form terms 
set out clear and unconditional consumer obligations but allow firm discretion that is exercised by a 
supervisory (and sometimes lower level) employee who is given the authority and discretion to 
forgive.”); U.S. Patent No. 7,797,212 (filed Oct 31, 2006), http://www.google.com/patents/US7797212 
(“[b]anks and other financial institutions must occasionally bend or break the rules for imposing fees 
against account holders in the name of customer relations.”). 
63. See         Why         Stay         at         Hampton?,         HAMPTON INN, 
http://hamptoninn3.hilton.com/en/about/index.html; 100% Hampton Inn Satisfaction Guarantee: The 
Definitive  Thread,  FLYERTALK,  http://www.flyertalk.com/forum/hilton-hilton-hhonors/465783-100 
-hampton-inn-satisfaction-guarantee-definitive-thread-20.html (numerous Hampton Inn guests posting 
anecdotes of being immediately offered free stays by the employee at the front desk); Robert Reiss, How 
Ritz-Carlton Stays at the Top, FORBES (Oct. 30, 2009), http://www.forbes.com/2009/10/30/simon 
-cooper-ritz-leadership-ceonetwork-hotels.html  (explaining  Ritz-Carlton’s  policy). 
64. See Martin Merzer, Poll: Asking for Better Credit Card Terms Pays Off, 
CREDITCARDS (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/poll-ask-better-terms.php. 
65. See, e.g., Flavio Martins, Companies Using Social Media Customer Service 
Effectively for Customer Retention and Loyalty, WINTHECUSTOMER (July 4, 2014), 
http://winthecustomer.com/effective-social-media-customer-service. 
66. See AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com (last visited Feb 9, 2016) (clicking on 
“Your Account,” then “Your Orders,” then “Leave seller feedback,” then the icon for one star out of 
five). 
67. See id. 
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of its employees, by electronically facilitating a discussion between buyer and 
seller.
68
 
Again, this emphasis on settlement is particularly striking because in a 
great number of these incidences, consumers would not have any credible 
threat to sue.
69 
Consumers and corporations are, through the complaint process, 
often determining what the terms of the contract should be even though 
arguably a contract is already in place.
70 
Thus, whereas privatization in mass 
torts is dominated by the settlement mill,
71 
in mass contracts the corporation is 
perhaps closer to a renegotiation mill. 
 
2. Procedural Justice 
 
As companies increasingly understand the relationship between profit and 
complaint handling, they are moving their internal processes toward some 
measures of procedural justice. Promoting a perception of procedural justice is 
profitable because unjust procedures risk angering even otherwise highly 
satisfied customers.
72  
Building off the seminal work of Tom Tyler, scholars 
have found that while the substantive outcome matters, the process is equally, if 
not more, important to consumers in their perceptions of justice.
73 
Even when a 
company provides relief such as money or store credit, consumers may view 
the experience unfavorably if they perceive the process as unfair.
74
 
More specifically, scholars have identified five main contributors to 
consumers’ perception of procedural justice, and thus to their overall 
satisfaction and loyalty to the company: voice, respect, speed, trustworthiness, 
and neutrality.
75
 
 
 
68. See Sarah Kessler, Ebay Spinoff Modria Is Judge Judy for Cyber Shoppers, 
FASTCOMPANY (Feb. 5, 2013), http://www.fastcompany.com/3005402/ebay-spinoff-modria-judge-judy 
-cyber-shoppers. 
69. See supra section I.A; supra note 49. 
70. The empirics thus lend support to Daniel Markovits’s theoretical account of 
customer service departments as sites of negotiation rather than adjudication. See MARKOVITS, supra 
note 14, at 1320. 
71. Cf. Engstrom, supra note 11 (describing law firms as tort settlement mills). 
72. See Homburg & Furst, supra note 37, at 108; Tor Wallin Andreassen, Antecedents 
to Satisfaction with Service Recovery, 34 J. EUROPEAN MARKETING. (2000) 168-71 (“The findings from 
the present study illustrate the importance of . . . an ability to create a perception of fairness in the 
outcome of the complaint.”). 
73. See, e.g., Hansen et al., supra note 50, at 10 (reviewing the literature on 
consumers’ perception of process and concluding procedure may be more important than substantive 
outcomes); Andreassen, supra note 72, at 168-71 (concluding based on a reflective measurement model 
that for consumers to be satisfied with the resolution, the complaint resolution process must be perceived 
as fair); see TYLER, supra note 17 (establishing the importance of procedural justice in the law). 
74. See Stone, supra note 35, at 112. 
75. See Andreassen, supra note 72, at 168-70 (discussing empirical evidence 
indicating the importance of consumers being able to express their grievances and a speedy resolution); 
Carl L. Saxby et al., Measuring Consumer Perceptions of Procedural Justice in a Complaint Context, 34 
J. CONSUMER AFF. 204, 214 (2000) (reviewing the literature on procedural justice in consumer disputes 
and concluding consumers care about two-way communications, decision makers’ trustworthiness, and 
the extent to which their grievance is understood); Stone, supra note 35, at 112 (reviewing empirical 
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First, companies increasingly employ communication tools that make 
consumers feel like they have a voice. The Royal Bank of Scotland sums up 
many companies’ philosophies, saying in its charter’s complaint resolution 
section, “We are committed to listening.”
76 
Customer service employees are 
trained to listen well by asking questions, acknowledging frustrations, and 
paraphrasing what was heard.
77 
Even online forms such as Amazon’s provide 
an opportunity for consumers to voice their concerns, with question headings 
such as “Tell us more about your issue.”
78
 
Second, companies have attempted to institutionalize good treatment of 
disputants. To accomplish this goal, they even provide customer service 
representatives with training in emotional intelligence.
79 
Studies of the rent-to- 
own business—historically viewed as one of the most problematic industries by 
many consumer advocates—suggest people are overall satisfied with their 
treatment.
80 
One found that most consumers who were late on a payment rated 
how they were treated as either “good” or “very good,” with only 15% rating 
their treatment as “poor” or “very poor.”
81
 
Third, companies generally prioritize speed. A slow response, even when 
otherwise effective, is harmful to the company’s relationship with the 
consumer.
82 
Consequently, companies will typically promise a resolution 
within a set number of days, rather than months.
83
 
 
 
 
research showing that how the customer is treated throughout the process—the person’s dignity—is 
important to consumers’ perception of the overall legitimacy of the process). 
76. See We Are Committed to Listening, ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND, 
https://www.rbs.co.uk/secure/global/customer-charter/default.asp; Robert Johnston & Sandy Mehra, 
Best-Practice Complaint Management, 16 ACAD. MGMT. EXECUTIVE 145, 145 (2002) (concluding best 
practice complaint resolution involves soliciting, listening to, and resolving complaints). 
77. Beaujean et al., supra note 40, at 68. 
78. See supra note 66. 
79. Beaujean et al., supra note 40, at 64. 
80. See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission, Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade 
Commission on Rent-to-Own Transactions Before the House Financial Services Committee Financial 
Institutions and Consumer Credit Subcommittee, at 6, (July 26, 2011), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/prepared-statement-federal-trade 
-commission-rent-own-transactions/110726renttoowntestimony.pdf. The rent-to-own industry is the 
subject of one of the most famous consumer protection cases, Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture, 
350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). See Anne Fleming, The Rise and Fall of Unconscionability as the “Law 
of the Poor”, 102 GEO. L.J. 1383 (2014). 
81. James M. Lacko et al., Customer Experience with Rent-to-Own Transactions, 21 
J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 126, 133 (2002). 
82. Gadi Benmark & Dan Singer, Turn Customer Care Into “Social Care” to Break 
Away from the Competition, HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 19, 2012), https://hbr.org/2012/12/turn-customer 
-care-into-social. 
83. See eBay Guarantee, EBAY, http://pages.ebay.com/ebay-money-back-guarantee/ 
(assuring a resolution within 30 days); Handling Customer Disputes, AMAZON, 
https://payments.amazon.com/help/201212320 (noting that if a customer files a dispute the seller “must 
respond within 5 business days with the requested information.”). Companies do, however, take greatly 
varying amounts of time to respond to consumer complaints. See Ian Ayres et al., Skeletons in the 
Database: An Early Analysis of the CFPB’s Consumer Complaints, 19 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 
343, 345-46 (2014) (“[B]ank of America, Citibank, and PNC Bank were all significantly less timely in 
responding to complaints than the average financial institution.”). 
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Fourth, corporations’ willingness to concede what may not be 
contractually required likely builds the consumer’s trust.
84 
Corporations build 
trust in other ways, including joint problem solving during the dispute 
resolution process and incorporating norms of flexibility.
85
 
Finally, corporations advance perceptions of neutrality most clearly when 
the corporation is a third-party adjudicator in the hundreds of millions of 
network trials.
86 
Yet even in more bilateral negotiations, such as the customer 
service context, effective explanations can advance perceptions of neutrality.
87 
When deciding against the consumer, companies typically offer explanations.
88 
They use neutral language implying they are on the same side as the consumer, 
such as saying “One alternative for you could be . . .” or “I can’t do that 
because . . .” instead of “You can’t.”
89 
Also, between 2003 and 2010, software 
end-user license agreements increasingly included provisions explaining 
consumers’ state and federal rights, although such provisions are not required 
by law.
90 
It is possible a consumer looking at such a contract provision after the 
dispute arose would see the explanation of their rights as a sign that the 
corporation is acting more neutrally, in accordance with more balanced 
principles of fairness, rather than merely trying to gain an advantage in an 
adversarial manner. Although some elements of neutrality are clearly missing,
91 
and the topic is in need of further study, corporations’ clauses and general 
approach illustrate ways in which they may advance perceptions of neutrality, 
and thus of procedural justice. 
 
 
 
 
 
84. See Hansen et al., supra note 50, at 10-11 (“[c]ompensation may serve to re- 
establish the potential decrease in confidence that the consumer may attach to the retailer as a 
consequence of the perceived loss.”); Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice 
in Negotiation: Procedural Fairness, Outcome Acceptance, and Integrative Potential, 33 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 473 (2008) (finding trust matters even in bilateral negotiations). 
85. See Bernstein, Procurement Contracts, supra note 21 (summarizing the literature 
on how trust may emerge in business relationships). 
86. See infra section I.C. 
87. See TYLER, supra note 17, at 516. 
88. See Angela Littwin, Why Process Complaints? Then and Now, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 
895, 944 (2015) (reporting that companies close with an explanation about three-fourths of the 
complaints received by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau from consumers, though noting that 
these complaints may not be representative). 
89. See Kristin Robertson, Saying No: How to Deliver Bad News to a Customer, KR 
CONSULTING   (Apr.   2014)   http://www.krconsulting.com/saying-no-how-to-deliver-bad-news-to-a 
-customer. 
90. See Marotta-Wurgler & Taylor, supra note 33, at 258 (finding that between 2003 
and 2010 “[t]he probability that a EULA informs consumers of their state and federal law rights rose by 
5.7%.”). 
91. For example, transparency and a lack of bias contribute to perceptions of 
neutrality. See TOM TYLER & RICK TRINKNER, LEGAL SOCIALIZATION IN AN ERA OF MISTRUST: 
FOSTERING THE POPULAR LEGITIMACY OF THE LAW (manuscript at 23) (forthcoming). While consumers 
may not be able to see corporations’ biased decisions because of the lack of transparency, corporations’ 
internal processes do a poorer job of offering those components of neutrality. See infra section II.B. 
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3. Procedural  Experimentalism 
 
Businesses learn and change through procedural experimentalism.
92 
Most 
immediately, because the financial stakes are so high, it is best practice for 
corporations to assess how well they resolve disputes and adjust accordingly. 
Moreover, companies increasingly view complaints as sources of information 
about how to improve their core business and thereby prevent disputes. 
Corporations have thus developed the type of dynamic feedback loop between 
disputes and policymaking to which the public system aspires. 
Improving dispute resolution begins with collecting and analyzing 
information. Companies solicit feedback through ubiquitous post-dispute 
satisfaction surveys. They study whether consumers continue to patronize the 
business after disputes.
93 
Analysts also quantify how complaint processes 
contribute to the company’s bottom line.
94
 
Companies   then    adjust   their   behavior   in    response.   Employee 
compensation often depends on how well the individual and the company 
resolve complaints.
95 
Businesses also regularly innovate complaint processes 
based on analytics. Call center managers test ways of communicating a 
problem resolution, and then compare which one produced the highest 
customer satisfaction.
96 
More boldly, they experiment with entirely new dispute 
mechanisms. eBay, for example, developed crowd-sourcing adjudication in 
which a jury of randomly selected buyers and sellers issues the final judgment 
on a dispute.
97
 
Complaint departments also feed what they learn into other parts of the 
organization  to  prevent  disputes.
98   
If  the  complaint  process  indicates  that 
certain contract clauses or sales practices lead to a high volume of complaints, 
executives are increasingly pressured to reengineer the product or practices 
when doing so might increase profits due to fewer complaints.
99 
For example, 
 
 
 
92. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 35, at 115 (“Service recovery is not just a ‘damage- 
control’ mechanism affecting the ‘shop floor’ level, but part of a company’s strategic planning to ensure 
that its offerings are continuously improved.”). Cf. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution 
of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998) (identifying democratic 
experimentalism in the governmental context). 
93. See Rule, supra note 19, at 771. 
94. See Benmark & Singer, supra note 82. 
95. See Stone, supra note 35, at 115-16 (mentioning companies linking employee 
salaries to individual customer service metrics, and to how well the company measures up to 
competitors in terms of complaint resolution). 
96. Rob Markey & Fred Reichheld, From Feedback to Action, BAIN INSIGHTS (Sept. 
21,   2012),   http://www.bain.com/publications/articles/from-feedback-to-action.aspx. 
97. Anjanette H. Raymond & Abbey Stemler, Trusting Strangers: Dispute Resolution 
in the Crowd, 16 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 357, 382 (discussing eBay and Alibaba’s use of users to 
form panels or “community courts” to decide cases). 
98. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 35, at 110 (concluding that the data collected in 
handling customer disputes “[m]ust be fed back to policy makers whose performance partly dependents 
on these data.”). 
99. See Markey & Reichheld, supra note 96. 
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JetBlue’s complaint department heard from a disgruntled passenger who had 
been charged an additional bike fee even though the bike folded up into a 
suitcase—a seemingly unjust rule. Less than twenty-four hours later, JetBlue 
had updated its policy to no longer charge extra for fold-up bikes.
100
 
Many companies also seek dispute information even when the customer 
has not reached out directly.
101 
Barclays Bank, for example, proactively asks 
consumers to submit complaints through leaflets and posters in its branches, 
and on statements mailed to customers.
102 
Similarly, companies ranging from 
Wells Fargo to Pizza Hut monitor social networks not for individual issues but 
for broader opportunities to improve customer satisfaction.
103
 
Of course, there are limits on how much a company will adjust its 
policies. Individual cases are handled with precedent in mind. As the head of 
JetBlue’s customer service has stated, “It’s really easy to want to jump to the 
rescue when we see a customer expressing concern . . . But we always try to 
think  about  the  long-term   implications  as  well.”
104    
Overall,  however, 
corporations are increasingly developing feedback loops that enable aggrieved 
consumers to influence dispute resolution policy. And surveys suggest 
satisfaction with customer service is overall improving.
105
 
 
4. Tailored Outcomes and Automated Decisions 
 
Corporate complaint processing is now often highly automated.
106 
This 
automation can significantly reduce the costs of dispute resolution.
107 
Perhaps 
more importantly from a dispute design perspective, it enables tailored 
decisionmaking. 
When  a  consumer  reaches  out  about  a  dispute,  computer  algorithms 
typically analyze all relevant internal and external information available to 
estimate two main variables: behavior and net worth.
108 
The behavioral analysis 
 
 
 
100. See A Day in the Life: Social Media, JetBlue Blue Tales Blog, JETBLUE (Jan. 19, 
2012),     http://blog.jetblue.com/index.php/2012/01/19/a-day-in-the-life-social-media. 
101. See Johnston & Mehra, supra note 76, at 147-49. 
102. See id. 
103. See, e.g., Martins, supra note 65. 
104. See A Day in the Life, supra note 100. 
105. See ‘Your Call Is Important to Us’ Or Is It?, CONSUMER REPORTS (Sept. 2015) 
(citing data from the Better Business Bureau suggesting fewer complaints, including in nine of the ten 
most troublesome industries, and offering original survey data suggesting fewer consumers  were 
agitated compared to 2011). 
106. See,   e.g.,   U.S.   Patent   No.   20,050,192,884   (filed   May   3,   2005), 
https://www.google.com/patents/US20050192884 (describing a system in which “[a] processor handles 
the chargeback inquiry so the merchant does not need to respond to chargeback inquiry requests.”). 
107. The leading provider of automated dispute systems, Modria, has stated that up to 
90% of cases are resolved through technology alone. See How It Works, MODRIA, 
http://modria.com/how-it-works (last visited April 24, 2015). 
108. See Julie Weed, For Uber, Airbnb and Other Companies, Customer Ratings Go 
Both Ways, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2014, (examining companies’ collection of data about consumers in 
various industries). 
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considers the consumer’s past behavior, such as the number of prior 
complaints.
109  
This helps to deter return abuse. It also predicts the likely 
response for that particular consumer if the request is granted or denied. 
Companies scientifically test how consumers respond to different levels of 
redress, using all predictive variables available. This tells them the likelihood 
of losing similar customers in the future if full, partial, or no concession is 
made.
110 
Companies are also integrating into their business decisions means of 
assessing a consumer’s online social influence over peers, such as the number 
of Twitter followers or Facebook friends.
111 
Incorporation of such practices 
into dispute resolution is in its early phases.
112
 
Algorithms merge these behavioral analyses with an estimate of the 
consumer’s  buying  power.  This  helps  predict,  based  on  internal  data  and 
external information such as the consumer’s e-commerce purchasing history at 
various companies, how profitable a consumer is likely to be.
113  
As Bank of 
America’s patent on its automated complaint handling software explains, the 
server may consider information such as the “profitability of the account” and 
“external factors, such as the personal relatives of the customers who are also 
account holders at the bank.”
114
 
This sophisticated and instantaneous analysis often decides much of what 
happens for a given dispute. When a consumer inputs account information into 
the online form or interactive phone menu, the algorithm may route the call to a 
particular department.
115 
This routing is aimed at saving phone time by better 
fitting the company’s expertise to the dispute. It also determines whether the 
caller is routed to an elite complaint handling department—with an internal 
 
 
 
109. See U.S. Patent No. 7,797,212, supra note 62 (describing a Bank of America 
refund tool that considers, among other factors, “[p]rior fees and refunds associated with the account.”). 
110. Telephone Interview with N.B. (June 12, 2015). 
111. See, e.g., Nate Cullerton, Behavioral Credit Scoring, 101 GEO. L.J. 807, 816 
(2013).  
112. Telephone Interview with S.N. (May 28, 2015). 
113. See Natasha Singer, Secret E-Scores Chart Consumers’ Buying Power, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 18, 2012, at BU1; Telephone Interview with N.B. (June 12, 2015). 
114. See U.S. Patent No. 7,797,212, supra note 62; Thomas Reeves, LINKEDIN, 
https://www.linkedin.com/pub/thomas-reeves/6/715/853 (last visited February 8, 2016) (former Bank of 
America employee describing responsibilities as including “Approved staff submissions for client 
refunds according to bank policy using Refund Request Tool.”). Discussion of the use of family 
members’ wealth to decide remedies is absent from the literature and thus it is difficult to know how 
broadly representative this example is. However, the use of such information is part of a more general 
phenomenon of companies using a variety of personal data to discriminate among consumers, and the 
use of information for deciding remedies is one of many applications. See Amy J. Schmitz, Secret 
Consumer Scores and Segmentations: Separating “Haves” from “Have-Nots”, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 
1411, 1420 (2014) (highlighting companies broad use of information about family and social networks 
and implying, but not stating, such information could be used for deciding remedies). 
115. See, e.g., Jen Wieczner, 10 Things Customer-Service Reps Won’t Tell You, 
MARKET WATCH (Jan. 17, 2012), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/10-things-customerservice-reps 
-wont-say-1326819855640 (describing how Bank of America has twenty customer service phone 
numbers that enables it to route customers to the employee best situated to deal with a particular 
complaint). 
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name such as Executive Customer Relations—or is relegated to an “overflow” 
call center, without the customer knowing.
116
 
These automated systems also increasingly administer the complaint.
117 
A 
simple version of this is the case of JPMorgan Chase, which recently 
implemented an algorithm that would automatically refund any online fee 
refund request under $50 without any human involvement.
118 
Likewise, large 
retail chains use software to monitor item returns and deny requests that they 
deem problematic, leaving the employee operating the cash register powerless 
to override.
119 
More generally, one of the principal goals of automated decision 
making is to reduce employee discretion, and thereby reduce inconsistency and 
emotionally driven decisions.
120
 
A noteworthy feature of these tailored decisions is that consumers are 
typically unaware of the decision-making process. They rarely know that their 
income, or their families’ income, was factored into the decision of whether to 
provide relief. Nor are they likely aware that a computer made the decision to 
deny a refund, and not the person on the phone or a human sender of the refund 
email. 
If firms’ internal processes are the courts of the future, judicial decisions 
are increasingly based on consumers’ characteristics rather than simply on the 
facts of the case, and the judges of the future are increasingly digital. 
 
C. The Corporation as Third-Party Adjudicator 
 
When settlement processes fail and the parties continue to pursue their 
grievances, the dispute may proceed to adjudication. The most common form 
of adjudication puts  the consumer-facing corporation in a third-party role 
between buyer and seller. This is a form of network trial, because the 
adjudicating  company  originally  connected  the  disputing  parties,  either 
 
 
 
 
 
116. See Singer, supra note 113 (reporting that electronic customer scores “can 
determine whether a customer is routed promptly to an attentive service agent or relegated to an 
overflow call center.”). 
117. See U.S. Patent No. 20,120,185,400 (filed Jan. 13, 2011), 
http://www.google.com/patents/US20120185400 (describing a software program that grants or denies 
fee refunds without any employee involvement necessary). 
118. Interview with J.E. (May 22, 2015) (current J.P. Morgan Chase employee 
describing system). Because the program prompted too large a number of consumers to request refunds, 
the bank subsequently updated the program to make it somewhat more difficult for consumers to obtain 
refunds. See id. See also Sood & Pinipe, supra note 18, at 7 (describing financial institutions deciding 
not to investigate to maintain customer satisfaction or because the amount disputed is too small). 
119. See Ariana Eunjung Cha, Some Shoppers Find Fewer Happy Returns, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 7, 2004, at A1. 
120. See U.S. Patent No. 7,797,212 (filed Oct 31, 2006), 
http://www.google.com/patents/US7797212 (explaining that an automated customer service tool 
benefits Bank of America by reducing reliance on employee discretion). 
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financially or digitally. Network trials are fast-growing and already account for 
hundreds of millions of disputes annually.
121
 
eBay’s approach is illustrative of many online companies’ roles as dispute 
intermediaries between buyers and sellers. eBay built a Resolution Center to 
handle its over sixty million annual disputes.
122 
This system uses software to 
ask for information, such as the details of the dispute and the buyer’s preferred 
outcome.
123 
The system then encourages the participants to message each other 
directly. If direct communication fails, the issue is escalated to the Resolution 
Center, a member of which makes a decision on the case.
124
 
After making a final decision, online intermediaries mostly limit their 
remedies to a refund for the consumer.
125 
Failure to comply leads to suspension 
from the online community, which is a powerful enforcement mechanism for 
large sellers who often rely on sites such as Amazon and eBay for a substantial 
portion of their revenues.
126
 
The growth of financial intermediation has also increasingly put financial 
institutions in an adjudicatory role between buyers and sellers. When 
consumers purchase goods or services with a credit card, federal law requires 
credit card issuers such as American Express in many instances to refund the 
consumer’s purchase if it is disputed.
127 
The issuer must then investigate the 
consumer’s dispute by collecting the appropriate information. This is called a 
chargeback, because the amount disputed is taken out of the seller’s account. 
Newer financial intermediaries such as PayPal offer similar chargeback 
functions.
128 
To enforce the verdict, in addition to community expulsion the 
intermediary company can freeze or automatically deduct funds in accounts.
129
 
 
 
 
 
121. See supra note 18 (calculating that a range of fifty million to one hundred 
million chargebacks annually would be a “conservative range.”). eBay alone handles sixty million 
disputes annually. See supra note 4. Yet eBay is only one of many large companies that play such a role. 
122. See Del Duca et al., supra note 4, at 205 (reporting sixty million disputes 
handled by eBay annually). 
 
123. See id. at 206-07.  
124. See id.     
125. See id. at 206.     
126. See Buyer Support Program, AMAZON, 
https://payments.amazon.com/sdui/sdui/about?nodeId=6025 (“Any seller that fails to cooperate in good 
faith to resolve a buyer’s complaint may have its account privileges restricted or terminated.”); Amy 
Martinez, Amazon Sellers Complain of Tied-up Payments, Account Shutdowns, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 
17, 2012. 
127. Chargebacks were required starting in 1968 with the passage of the Truth in 
Lending Act. See Raymond & Stemler, supra note 94, at 379. 
128. Both PayPal and credit card companies first attempt to encourage the parties to 
communicate directly before ultimately rendering a verdict on the case if necessary. See Raymond & 
Stemler, supra note 127, at 380 (describing PayPal as “providing for chargebacks when necessary” and 
concluding that as a result “[o]utcomes of the dispute resolution process are easily and simply enforced 
via the payment mechanism.”). 
129. See, e.g., AMAZON PAYMENTS, supra note 126 (“[A]mazon Payments may place 
a hold on funds in a seller’s account if the seller does not respond timely to a dispute or does not honor a 
commitment made to resolve a dispute within a reasonable amount of time.”). 
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In both these contexts, the intermediary does receive a cut of whatever 
sale is being disputed, and this small fraction of the dispute would potentially 
be refunded if the corporation decides in favor of the consumer. The third-party 
company also wants to encourage consumers to continue using its services. 
Thus, it is not a completely disinterested party. Yet the intermediary is a neutral 
party in that it did not directly participate in the disputed incident. 
These processes are in need of greater study to draw strong conclusions. 
However, preliminary evidence indicates that they work for buyers and 
sellers.
130 
Consumers rarely complain about chargebacks.
131 
eBay found that 
consumers who went through its internal adjudication were significantly more 
likely to shop at the website in the future than customers who did not go 
through any dispute process or who went through an outside dispute resolution 
mechanism.
132
 
At a basic level, though, it is important to understand that these 
adjudicatory processes are fundamentally different from arbitration and from 
the traditional customer service department. Whereas scholars worry about 
anti-consumer arbitrator bias because corporations bring arbitrators business,
133 
the corporate intermediary’s business depends on those millions of consumers 
it is adjudicating. Also, arbitrators and public judges engage in qualitatively 
similar decisionmaking and apply the law to cases.
134 
In contrast, intermediary 
corporations’ decision makers follow internal company guidelines and are 
usually not lawyers.
135  
And unlike customer service departments, which are 
consumers’ opposing party, intermediary corporations are usually separate 
legal entities from consumers’ opposing parties.
136
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
130. See, e.g., Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Dispute Resolution in Cyberspace: Demand for 
New Forms of ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 675, 691 (2000) (“Although good empirical data is 
lacking, it appears that the [chargeback] system satisfies both consumers and merchants.”). 
131. See Del Duca et al., supra note 4, at 208 (noting consumers rarely complain 
about chargebacks). 
132. See Rule, supra note 19, at 774 (finding consumers were more likely to shop at 
eBay after having their disputes resolved through the company’s resolution center, but when consumers 
chose instead to dispute through the credit card chargeback system, buyers were no more likely to use 
the website than if a dispute had never occurred). The methodology used does not allow for causality to 
be conclusively established. 
133. See, e.g., William W. Park, Arbitrator Bias, 12 TRANSNAT’L DISPUTE MGMT., 
(2015), http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=2265 (“No one with a dog 
in the fight should judge the competition. . . . Consequently, few tasks present the vital urgency of 
establishing standards for evaluating the independence and impartiality of arbitrators.”) 
134. See W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Judging Lite: How Arbitrators Make and Use 
Precedent, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1091, 1091 (2012). 
135. In the tort context, the settlement of disputes by non-lawyers in “settlement 
mills” raises questions about the unauthorized practice of law. See Engstrom, supra note 11, at 841. 
136. The legal relationship is, however, somewhat muddled. See, e.g., Brishen 
Rogers, The Social Costs of Uber, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 85 (2015) (discussing open questions 
about whether Uber drivers are employees). 
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D. The Corporation as Reputation-Based Enforcement Mechanism 
 
Reputation-based sanctions and network governance have served crucial 
functions in business-to-business private legal systems such as in the diamond, 
cotton, and grain industries.
137 
Similarly, rural neighbors in some parts of the 
country resort to negative gossip as the most common first step to enforce 
breached norms regarding trespass of cattle.
138 
In those systems, both informal 
mechanisms, such as gossip, and formal mechanisms, such as information 
bureaus, play important roles.
139 
The consumer legal system is evolving toward 
a similar reliance on reputation-based governance mechanisms. 
Consumer markets’ informal reputation mechanisms come not from close- 
knit gossip networks but through a variety of websites designed for consumer 
reviews, such as Yelp, as well as more general purpose websites—such as 
Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube—that consumers nonetheless widely use to 
give feedback about companies. 
Individual disputes handled badly can also go viral. When United Airlines 
baggage handlers broke David Carroll’s guitar, the musician spent nine months 
attempting to convince customer representatives to fix the instrument. After 
what he described as repeated indifference, he recorded and posted a music 
video on YouTube—“United Breaks Guitars”—that received over 15 million 
views.
140 
United ultimately not only offered to pay for damages, but also 
improved its agents’ ability to escalate claims internally.
141  
Numerous other 
complaints, such as one customer’s video of a three-hour failed attempt to 
cancel Comcast cable services, have reached millions of viewers.
142
 
Consumers also use these sites for direct advocacy about specific dispute 
resolution policies. For example, when retailers such as Best Buy, Macy’s, and 
Toys “R” Us introduced a restocking fee of up to 15% for returned items, 
backlashes on Twitter and Facebook helped prompt companies retracting those 
 
 
 
 
137. See Bernstein, Private Ordering, supra note 21, at 1. 
138. See Ellickson, supra note 21, at 677. 
139. See Bernstein, Cotton Industry, supra note 21, at 1745 (describing the cotton 
industry’s successful efforts to make “reputation-based nonlegal sanctions (like negative gossip, which 
may lead to refusal to deal) an important force in the industry.”); Bernstein, Diamond Industry, supra 
note 21, at 121-22 (detailing the use of reputation bonds in the diamond industry). 
140. See United Breaks Guitars, YOUTUBE, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5YGc4zOqozo. 
141. See Brett Snyder, United Aggressively Responds to “United Breaks Guitars Part 
2,” CBS MONEY WATCH (Aug. 4, 2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/united-aggressively-responds 
-to-united-breaks-guitars-part-2. 
142. See, e.g., Comcast Left Me on Hold for 3+ Hours—Until It Closed, CNN 
MONEY (Aug. 15, 2014), http://money.cnn.com/2014/08/15/technology/comcast-three-hour-hold 
(describing how photographer Aaron Spain videoed himself on hold for over three hours, until after 
Comcast had closed, and before long had over one million hits); Comcast Service Disconnection, 
SOUNDCLOUD https://soundcloud.com/ryan-block-10/comcastic-service (last visited February 9, 2016) 
(sharing an audio recording of a customer’s attempt to cancel Comcast services, which received over 6 
million hits). 
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policies.
143 
Similarly, in 2014, General Mills announced that those who bought 
its  products  or  used  its  social  media  were  agreeing  to  settle  disputes  in 
arbitration. A social media outcry ensued, and within days the company 
retracted the policy.
144
 
More formal private mechanisms for feedback have also developed. These 
sites are specifically designed to aggregate reputational information, typically 
into something like a five-star rating system. Some, such as Ripoff Report, take 
an antagonistic approach seemingly geared toward shaming the company into 
defending itself publicly.
145 
Others, such as Yelp, are more neutral.
146
 
The array of reputational websites matter mostly because they can 
influence consumers’ decisions. According to one recent survey, almost 70% of 
consumers rely on online reviews before purchasing a product, and that number 
is growing.
147 
Yelp is one of the most visited sites in the United States and is 
used by almost one hundred million Americans, or about one in three.
148 
The 
Better Business  Bureau’s  ratings  website has  over ten million visits  each 
month.
149 
Also, consumers trust online reviews—particularly those conveying 
negative  information.
150
 
The mere fact that reputation websites influence consumers suggests that 
rationally acting corporations would pay attention to the sites. Further evidence 
of these websites’ influence comes from the behavior of consumer companies, 
which   have   developed   groups   to   manage   and   monitor   social   media 
complaints.
151 
The fact that individual complaints can go viral or lead to online 
reviews that permanently damage a company’s reputation forces companies to 
take extra caution with individual consumer disputes—assuming companies 
cannot distinguish consumers who will complain. It also influences how 
executives design dispute resolution processes. 
 
 
143. See Miguel Bustillo, Retailers Loosen Up on Returns—Tough Policies of Recent 
Years Spurred Consumer Complaints and Often Became Impediment to Sales, WALL ST. J., Dec 27, 
2010, at B.1. 
144. See Stephanie Strom, General Mills Reverses Itself on Consumers’ Right to Sue, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2014, at A.17. 
145. See RIPOFF REPORT, http://www.ripoffreport.com. 
146. See YELP, www.yelp.com. 
147. See Ashlee Kieler, Nearly 70% Of Consumers Rely On Online Reviews Before 
Making A Purchase, CONSUMERIST (June 3, 2015), http://consumerist.com/2015/06/03/nearly-70-of 
-consumers-rely-on-online-reviews-before-making-a-purchase. 
148. See How Popular Is Yelp.com?, ALEXA, http://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/yelp.com 
(listing Yelp as the 32nd most visited U.S. website) (last visited February 9, 2016); Yelp Network, 
QUANTCAST, https://www.quantcast.com/yelp.com (estimating monthly U.S. unique Yelp visitors at 
107.7 million) (last visited February 9, 2016). 
149. See How Popular Is bbb.org?, ALEXA, http://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/bbb.org 
(last visited Feb. 8, 2016). 
150. See   Why   Ratings   and   Reviews   Suck   and   How   To   Save   Them, 
SOCIALMEDIATODAY,      http://www.socialmediatoday.com/content/why-ratings-and-reviews-suck-and 
-how-save-them-0 (Feb. 13, 2012) (discussing the high trust consumers place in online reviews); Luo & 
Homburg, supra note 36, at 31-32 (discussing empirical research suggesting that negative information 
has a stronger effect on buyers than positive feedback). 
151. See, e.g. Martins, supra note 65. 
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The extent to which reputation-based sanctions enable a private ordering 
will vary by industry and over time.
152 
Overall, however, reputation websites 
thus provide a market-monitoring mechanism for problematic dispute 
resolution practices within corporations. Although few consumers ever 
consider any particular dispute resolution practice or clause ex ante, if a clause 
violates norms of fairness, it could negatively impact online reputation scores 
through the ratings of those subjected to it ex post. The simple aggregate 
reputation score of, say, two out of five stars enables consumers who would not 
even think to look at the details of lengthy contracts to nonetheless incorporate 
the implications of those contracts into their purchase decisions.
153
 
 
II. Promises and Pitfalls of the Corporation as Courthouse 
 
Existing institutional analyses of privatized dispute resolution have mostly 
compared arbitration to the courts. However, the key dichotomy is not between 
arbitration and courts—which have been shown to be similar based on many 
important metrics such as application of legal precedent—but rather between 
those formal mechanisms and more informal ones such as corporations’ 
internal processes.
154 
This shift in perspective reveals a distinct set of promises 
and pitfalls in privatized dispute resolution. 
 
A. The Promise of the Corporation as Courthouse 
 
1. Low-cost Access to Redress 
 
If the literature is correct that litigants ultimately “want [dispute 
resolution] routes that are quick, cheap, and relatively stress-free,”
155 
the 
corporation as courthouse may deliver on what matters most to consumers. 
Consumers can initiate the customer service process in a few seconds by 
tweeting, or in a few minutes by calling or chatting online. They can similarly 
start a network trial by filling out a quick dispute form on the Web.
156 
Although 
public courts are becoming increasingly automated, initiating a case in the 
public legal system requires navigating a dizzying set of procedures and filling 
 
 
152. See Richman, supra note 21 (concluding that a shift in the structure of the 
diamond industry weakened reputation-based sanctions that had once sustained cooperation); Florencia 
Marotta-Wurgler, Will Increased Disclosure Help? Evaluating the Recommendations of the ALI’s 
“Principles of the Law of Software Contracts,” 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 165, 184 (2011) (finding that in the 
software industry few consumers consult online reviews before making purchases). 
153. This is so because most consumers will not read through all of the reviews, and 
instead will look at the aggregate score. 
154. On the similarity of decision making by courts and arbitrators, see, e.g., 
Weidemaier, supra note 134, at 1091. 
155. See Engstrom, supra note 11, at 836 (quoting HAZEL GENN ET AL., PATHS TO 
JUSTICE: WHAT PEOPLE DO AND THINK ABOUT GOING TO LAW 254–55 (1999)). 
156. See, e.g., Nick Clements (@npclements), TWITTER (June 5, 2015, 8:47 AM 
EST), https://twitter.com/npclements/status/606849904070283264 (reporting a successful chargeback 
case through J.P. Morgan Chase taking less than five minutes). 
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out complicated forms. Additionally, court processes typically require 
appearing in person at least once, if not multiple times. Finally, corporations’ 
dispute processes are free, whereas even small claims courts have prohibitive 
fees for most small-value complaints.
157 
These factors, and what is known 
about network trials, indicate that private processes increase the likelihood that 
consumers will pursue claims.
158
 
Once the dispute process is initiated, customer service calls can also lead 
to settlements in minutes, and network trials typically take a few hours or 
days.
159 
By contrast, small claims and arbitration cases take months.
160
 
The private system likely provides further savings to consumers, 
corporations, and government in three main ways. First, both consumers and 
corporations avoid lawyers’ fees because settlement-oriented market forces, 
rather than adjudicatory legal devices, provide the principal mechanism for 
governance. Second, the private system is more sophisticated at avoiding non- 
meritorious claims. The public legal system cares about frivolous lawsuits, but 
has done a poor job of preventing them.
161 
By contrast, companies invest in 
advanced software systems to deter frivolous complaints. Bad-faith returns may 
cost goods retailers alone up to an estimated fifteen billion dollars annually.
162 
This provides strong economic incentives to companies to prevent such abuse. 
Third, corporations lower costs through highly automated dispute resolution 
processes.
163 
These broad savings on dispute resolution would be expected to 
advance consumer welfare, such as by lowering prices.
164
 
 
 
 
 
157. See CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, Arbitration Study, at section 4.3 
(2015), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-to-congress-2015.pdf 
(finding small claims fees of $63 to $112 in Philadelphia Municipal Courts). 
158. See Nancy A. Welsh & David B. Lipsky, “Moving the Ball Forward” in 
Consumer and Employment Dispute Resolution, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2013, at 16 (mentioning a 
Federal Trade Commission study finding that chargeback availability is correlated with higher incidence 
of consumer claims). 
159. See, e.g., Del Duca et al., supra note 4, at 208 (reporting that eBay’s 
adjudication delivers verdicts within forty-eight hours). 
160. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 3, at 81, 101 (finding contractual cases 
take 21.5 months between complaint and resolution in state courts and estimating the average consumer 
arbitration at six to eight months). 
161. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the 
Substantive Merits, 51 DUKE L.J. 1251, 1313-14 (2002) (adopting thirty percent as the hypothetical 
figure for the percent of class action cases filed that are frivolous and calling for reforms that would 
deny certification). 
162. See Cha, supra note 119. 
163. See Maurits Barendrecht & Christopher Honeyman, Dispute Resolution: 
Existing Business Models and Looming Disruptions, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2014, at 20-21 
(describing gradual adoption by many public courts of online dispute mechanisms); supra Section I.B.4. 
(discussing highly automated corporate dispute processes). 
164. The relationship between mandatory arbitration and lower prices is debated. But 
overall, in competitive markets, industry-wide savings would be expected to result in lower prices. See 
Orley Ashenfelter et al., Identifying the Firm-Specific Cost Pass-Through Rate, at 14-15 (F.T.C., 
Working Paper No. 217, 1998), http://www.ftc.gov/reports/identifying-firm-specific-cost-pass-through 
-rate. 
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2. Greater Value for Those Who Complain 
 
Corporate processes have the potential to provide effective substantive 
outcomes for many consumers. At a broad level, because of the cost savings 
and removal of lawyers’ fees, it is theoretically possible that corporations could 
pay less overall for dispute resolution while paying consumers more in 
settlements. The data do not exist to draw firm conclusions on this matter. 
However, corporations do probably provide more substantive redress for those 
who actually complain. 
Corporations arguably provide more substantive redress simply by 
providing greater access to redress. Most consumers for small-value 
transaction-based disputes would never bring a case in court or in arbitration, 
but do complain to corporations and obtain redress. While the substantive 
results will vary, even legal scholars highly critical of corporations’ complaint 
handling acknowledge that when consumers push, they often get what they 
want.
165
 
Putting aside the issue of access, even some consumers who would have 
brought individual lawsuits or been part of class actions fare better in the 
corporation as courthouse. This follows from the fact that customer service 
departments—as well as network trials such as those run by Uber and 
American Express—regularly grant consumers’ requests even if no legal claim 
exists.
166 
In addition, the majority of online chargebacks are not even disputed 
by merchants.
167 
Finally, assuming that consumers weigh substantive outcomes 
in their overall satisfaction, it can be inferred that those who enter network 
trials do well substantively: Consumers rarely complain about chargebacks, and 
eBay found that consumers gave the company even more business after going 
through its adjudication process.
168 
Although more studies of outcomes are 
needed, the available data provide little evidence that network trials offer less 
redress than courts or arbitrators.
169 
And because consumers pay no court, 
arbitration, or legal fees, they keep all of whatever award is granted. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
165. See, e.g., Nader, supra note 13, at 1012. 
166. See supra Section I.B.1 (discussing customer service departments); Interview 
with M.H. (July 25, 2015) (stating that American Express grants chargeback requests to most valuable 
customers even when it does not recover from the merchant); Interview with J.B. (July 26, 2015) 
(stating that Uber regularly grants complaining consumers’ requests even if they have no legal claim). 
167. See Tom Cain, Risky Business: Best Practices for Managing Cardholder Dispute 
and Chargeback Processes in Challenging Times, TSYS MANAGED SERVICES 4 (2012), 
http://tsys.com/Assets/TSYS/downloads/wp_risky-business-best-practices-for-dispute-and 
-chargeback.pdf (citing an industry study finding that if e-commerce merchants challenge thirty-five to 
forty percent of chargebacks it is a “high percentage”). 
168. See Rule, supra note 19. 
169. See infra Section II.B.3 (discussing the distributional implications of corporate 
complaint systems). 
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3. Direct Accountability 
 
A frequent and powerful criticism of privatized dispute resolution is that it 
lacks accountability. This critique identifies an important shortcoming. 
However, unlike arbitration, the broader private consumer legal system offers 
strong informal accountability mechanisms.
170
 
One primary concern about accountability in arbitration is the absence of 
an appeals process. By contrast, corporations’ internal dispute processes offer 
several avenues for appeal. Consumers denied redress by a customer service 
representative can appeal to higher authorities within the organization, even 
sometimes obtaining redress by writing directly to the CEO.
171 
Third-party 
corporations also provide appeals. Consumers who are turned away by the 
customer service department can later obtain redress after bringing their case to 
reputation websites or to the intermediary credit card company.
172
 
While the frequency and success rate of most of these appeals processes 
remain understudied, compared to more formal appeals processes they are 
easier to initiate and appear to be widely used.
173 
Moreover, these appeals 
processes have staying power. One hotel recently invoked a clause making 
guests pay $500 for every negative review left online. When word spread, its 
Yelp rating quickly plummeted to one star out of five, and the hotel ended the 
policy.
174
 
The appeals themselves, and often consumer complaints, are also to some 
extent held accountable. Amazon reviewers can rate reviews as unhelpful, thus 
lessening their visibility.
175  
When Harvard Business School Professor Ben 
Edelman aggressively complained to a small business about being overcharged 
by four dollars on a Chinese food takeout order, asking for treble damages 
based on Massachusetts consumer protection statutes, he was forced to 
apologize after a strong Internet backlash.
176
 
 
 
 
170. It is also possible that privatization increases more formal political 
accountability in some contexts. See Jack M. Beerman, Administrative Law-Like Obligations on 
Private[ized] Entities, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1717 (2002). 
171. See, e.g., Paul Michael, How I Got Two CEOs To Listen to My Complaints, 
WISEBREAD, http://www.wisebread.com/how-i-got-two-ceos-to-listen-to-my-complaints (explaining 
how one customer obtained redress for separate disputes by contacting the CEOs of Firestone and 
Deluxe Rentacar); Wieczner, supra note 115 (mentioning how, after customer service turned her away, 
one Apple customer wrote a complaint letter to then-CEO Steve Jobs and received a new iPod). 
172. See supra Section I.C. & I.D. 
173. See supra Section II.A.1 for a discussion of the ease of access of corporate 
dispute resolution mechanisms, of which appeals are a subset. Also, consumers collectively use third- 
party reputation websites and credit card companies hundreds of millions of times annually, suggesting 
they are often used for appeals. See supra Sections I.C & I.D. 
174. See, e.g., Jackie Huba, Lessons From the Hotel That Fines Customers $500 For 
Negative Online Reviews, FORBES, Aug. 4, 2014, at 13. 
175. See, e.g., James Grimmelmann, The Virtues of Moderation, 17 YALE J.L. & 
TECH. 42, 60 (2015). 
176. See Elizabeth Barber, A Harvard Professor Launched an Epic Rant Over an 
Extra $4 on his Chinese Takeout Bill, TIME, Dec. 10, 2014. 
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Despite some self-governance of consumer behavior, appeals in the 
informal system often favor the consumer. Once the corporation grants a 
refund, it would be unusual for the corporation to appeal. In contrast, judicial 
appeals can benefit either the corporation or the consumer, and likely favor the 
party with more resources.
177  
Thus, since criticism about a lack of appeal is 
often based on concern about consumers’ rights, this concern is mitigated in the 
private consumer legal system by the fact that informal appeals are 
disproportionately available to the consumer. 
Moving beyond the issue of appeals, in some ways private dispute 
processes offer more accountability than do courts.
178 
As discussed above, 
corporations monitor the satisfaction levels of customers after the complaint is 
resolved. They update their substantive and procedural policies regularly in a 
dynamic feedback loop. They experiment with and innovate their procedures in 
response to customer feedback.
179
 
No remotely commensurate feedback mechanism, innovation, or process 
oversight exists in courthouses. Litigants cannot choose among courthouses or 
judges to the same extent that they can among corporations.
180  
Nor is loyalty 
particularly valued; indeed, given the backlog in most courts, it is almost 
institutionally advantageous to overburdened court employees if consumers 
decide not to bring future suits as a result of bad experiences. This means that 
consumers have little opportunity to influence public courts through exit, voice 
and loyalty.
181  
With the exception of elected judges in some jurisdictions, 
courts are largely insulated from direct accountability to their constituents. 
It is true that consumer disputes are mostly resolved without a formal 
judicial appeals process and thus lack a key accountability mechanism available 
in public courts. However, the private consumer legal system can offer strong 
accountability through informal appeals and direct responsiveness to 
consumers’  interests.
182
 
 
 
177. See, e.g., Donald R. Songer et al., Do the “Haves” Come out Ahead over Time? 
Applying Galanter’s Framework to Decisions of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 1925-1988, 33 L. & SOC’Y 
REV. 811, 830 (1999) (finding advantages for parties with greater resources, but noting further research 
is needed). 
178. See, e.g., Susan Sturm & Howard Gadlin, Conflict Resolution and Systemic 
Change, 2007 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 4 (2007) (arguing more generally that organizational alternative dispute 
resolution processes can provide forms of accountability “from the linkage of individual and systemic 
conflict resolution.”). 
179. See supra Section I.B.3. 
180. The main exception is the occasional forum shopping for more sophisticated 
litigants in high-value disputes. 
181. Cf. ALBERT HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970) (discussing the 
role of exit, voice, and loyalty in organizations). If the organization in question is the piece of litigation, 
rather than the court, consumers do have recourse to exit, voice, and loyalty. 
182. In this regard, consumer corporations have brought a form of voice and self- 
governance that scholars have advocated more broadly for corporations. See, e.g., ROGERS ET AL., supra 
note 16, at 132 (advocating a collaborative approach to dispute systems design); Katharina Pistor, 
Multinational Corporations as Regulators and Central Planners: Implications for Citizens’ Voice in 
CORPORATIONS AND CITIZENSHIP, 246 (Greg Urban, ed., U. Penn. Press, 2014) (arguing for “Bringing 
voice and principles of self-governance into the [multinational corporation] space. . .”). 
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4. Truth, Justice, and Community 
 
Society has interests in its dispute system that go beyond those that can be 
monetized.
183 
Perhaps the most prominent among these are truth, justice, and 
community. The private consumer dispute system, in some regards, advances 
these ideals. 
Promoting truth and justice is the most prominent justification for the 
adversary legal system.
184 
Scholars have often challenged the adversary 
system’s ability to deliver on this promise.
185 
Given unequal representation in 
the courts, “a system of adjudication that truly promoted truth and justice in 
dispute resolution would permit far less adversary assertiveness than the current 
system allows.”
186 
These concerns carry additional weight in the contractual 
consumer context due to the strong resource imbalance between consumers and 
corporations. Moreover, because concentrated business groups can heavily 
influence the legislative process,
187 
even a system that flawlessly applied the 
law could produce unjust outcomes. 
The corporation as courthouse offers an alternative. Contract law can be 
seen as embodying an ideal of collaboration that is at the heart of modern 
economic and political institutions.
188 
As such, contracts are more than 
instruments for wealth generation and reflect, in a certain sense, norms of 
community and an essential component of coexistence.
189 
In a mass-contracting 
age, customer service departments serve as the principal site for negotiations 
between consumers and corporations. They consequently offer, as Daniel 
Markovits puts it, “potential to function as sites of social solidarity—as analogs 
to the village market.”
190
 
This Article’s analysis suggests that corporations are moving towards that 
vision, not only through their customer service departments but more broadly in 
their various court-like roles. This is so even if it makes no sense that the 
corporation would intrinsically value community or norms of collaboration. 
Instead, those norms are brought into the system in two main ways. Most 
 
 
183. See ROGERS ET AL., supra note 16, at 201 (discussing a broader set of goals and 
interests in dispute systems). 
184. See Daniel Markovits, Arbitration’s Arbitrage: Social Solidarity at the Nexus of 
Adjudication and Contract, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 431, 449 (2010) (describing the most prominent 
justification of the adversary system as the argument that “adjudication tracks truth and justice.”). 
185. See, e.g., Catherine Albiston, The Dark Side of Litigation as a Social Movement 
Strategy, 96 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 61, 74-77 (2011); Markovits, supra note 184, at 449-51 (arguing that 
the adversary system does not ensure truth and justice). 
186. See Markovits, supra note 184, at 450. 
187. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Positive Theory As Normative Critique, 68 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 1565, 1570 (1995). 
188. Daniel Markovits, Contract and Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J. 1417, 1421 
(2004). Scholars have often interpreted contract law as embodying moral principles such as freedom, 
harm, and welfare. See id. 
189. It  follows  that  there  may  be  moral  reasons  for  enforcing  contracts.  See 
Markovits, supra note 188, at 1422. 
190. See MARKOVITS, supra note 14, at 1321. 
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significantly, because corporations are increasingly attempting to provide what 
consumers value in dispute resolution,
191 
those processes would be expected to 
evolve toward procedures that reflect community norms. Additionally, 
employees must ultimately exercise discretion in a great number of dispute 
resolution cases. Employees’ social norms influence how they exercise that 
discretion, such as whether they comply with company policies.
192
 
It should thus not be surprising that the corporation as courthouse 
increasingly operates under principles of justice and collaboration. Elements of 
procedural justice such as skilled listening, respectful treatment, and 
trustworthiness create a sense of connectedness that promotes ongoing 
relations.
193 
This would explain the counter-intuitive finding that following 
well-handled internal disputes, consumers give the company more business 
than before, even when consumers’ requests are denied.
194 
This is true not only 
in the customer service negotiation, but when the corporation acts as network 
judge.
195
 
The centrality of community can also be seen in language and sanctions. 
The use of expulsion from the online community as an enforcement mechanism 
underscores this relational dimension.
196 
Amazon even explicitly states above 
its complaint form “Thank you for reporting a community rules violation.”
197 
Reputation-based sanctions also enable more collaborative relations in 
consumer markets just as they do in other commercial contexts—including 
among diamond merchants, cotton traders, and lobster trappers.
198  
Feedback 
left on websites or tweets are a form of expression to other community 
members about the transgression of a shared norm. 
Thus, consumers and corporations resolve disputes mostly in relation to 
norms, rather than laws. The private consumer legal system has the potential to 
buttresses collaborative relations that antagonistic public court processes sever. 
While this discussion should not be taken to argue that a privatized system is 
 
 
 
191. See supra Sections I.A. and I.B. 
192. See Sijun Wang et al., Employees’ Decision Making in the Face of Customers’ 
Fuzzy Return Requests, 76 J. MARKETING 69, 80 (2012). 
193. See supra Section I.B.2. 
194. See Stone, supra note 35, at 112-13. 
195. See, e.g., Rule, supra note 19, at 772 (discussing eBay’s internal study that 
concluded consumers used eBay more after dispute resolution). Because these conclusions rely on 
companies’ internal studies they may reflect biased results. 
196. See AMAZON, supra note 126 (“Any seller that fails to cooperate in good faith to 
resolve a buyer’s complaint may have its account privileges restricted or terminated.”). Cf. Bernstein, 
Cotton Industry, supra note 21, at 1737-38 (discussing how a cotton merchant’s failure to abide by trade 
association extralegal enforcement mechanisms would result in expulsion from the industry’s primary 
trade association); Robert C. Bordone, Electronic Online Dispute Resolution: A Systems Approach- 
Potential, Problems, and a Proposal, 3 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 175, 178 (1998) (arguing for dispute 
resolution adapted to the customs, norms, and rules of online communities). 
197. See Contact Us, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/reports/contact-us. 
198. See supra Section I.D.; JAMES M. ACHESON, THE LOBSTER GANGS OF MAINE 
(1988). 
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normatively superior,
199 
the private dispute system does not obviously fail to 
advance society’s non-monetary interests any more than the public court 
system does. Each at its best has a claim on legitimacy.
200 
Paradoxically, profit- 
motivated corporations often design dispute processes that enshrine community 
values. 
 
B. The Pitfalls of the Corporation as Courthouse 
 
1. Lack of Transparency 
 
Scholars have often criticized the lack of transparency in arbitration.
201 
Even though legal cases rarely go to trial, when they do they become public 
record.
202 
Arbitral decisions usually do not.
203 
However, even arbitration is 
considerably more transparent than corporations’ internal dispute processes.
204
 
As a start, arbitrators commonly post their basic procedures online.
205 
Arbitrators also apply the law to the facts presented at trial, and do not consider 
extrinsic factors such as the consumer’s profitability to the company.
206  
In 
contrast, the consumer corporation’s procedures and criteria for making a 
decision are kept confidential. They may consider factors well beyond the law, 
without the consumer knowing. 
 
 
 
 
 
199. Indeed, scholars have argued the larger move away from trials erodes important 
clarification of legal norms. See David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. 
L.J. 2619, 2622–23 (1995). 
200. From a normative perspective, Lawrence Solum has argued that “a core right of 
participation is essential for the legitimacy of adjudication.” Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 
S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 274 (2004). As discussed above, the nature of participation in the corporation as 
courthouse is different from, but not immediately inferior to, that in public courts. See supra Section 
II.A.1. 
201. See, e.g., Glover, supra note 27, at 3052 (“[p]rivate parties can exercise [] quasi- 
lawmaking power almost entirely outside of public view, through rarely read and little-understood 
provisions in contracts of adhesion subject to scant public scrutiny or regulatory oversight.”). 
202. Most consumer cases entering the public courthouse are settled and thus may not 
become public record. See CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau Study Finds That Arbitration Agreements Limit Relief for Consumers 2-3, 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_factsheet_arbitration-study.pdf (finding that of 3,462 
individual lawsuits only two went to trial). Settlements create their own challenges in terms of 
transparency and ongoing judicial involvement. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 26, at 1082; Minna J. Kotkin, 
Invisible Settlements, Invisible Discrimination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 927 (2006) (concluding that invisible 
settlements make discrimination in the workplace itself invisible). 
203. However, several states require arbitrators to release case data publicly. See 
Resnik, supra note 2, at 2897. 
204. Scholars have highlighted transparency concerns in the context of the mass 
settlement of torts. See Engstrom, supra note 11. 
205. See, e.g., Consumer Arbitration Rules, AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, 
https://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/aoe/gc/consumer (Jan. 1, 2016). 
206. See, e.g., Weidemaier, supra note 134, at 1091 (empirically concluding there is 
little evidence that “arbitrators and judges engage in qualitatively different kinds of decision-making or 
opinion-writing.”). 
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2. Procedural Inequality and Discrimination 
 
Corporations’ highly tailored dispute processes violate a fundamental 
principle of the legal system: like cases should be treated alike.
207 
Among other 
reasons why procedural inconsistency might be problematic,  it raises 
distributional  concerns. 
Studies have for decades found that wealthier and better-educated 
consumers are more likely to complain to corporations and are more successful 
when they do than are low-income consumers.
208 
However, the same is true in 
the judicial system.
209  
A key difference is that public courts and arbitral 
tribunals are designed for procedural equality, while corporations’ internal 
processes are designed to discriminate. 
Companies create unequal procedures for like cases based on factors such 
as how much the consumer can spend and the worth of the consumer’s personal 
ties.
210  
This means that corporations might deliberately treat two consumers 
with equal wealth and the same exact dispute differently based on the family or 
neighborhood in which the consumers were raised. This adds another layer of 
economic inequality onto those already present in courts, arbitration, and the 
traditional customer service department.
211
 
These dynamics intersect in complicated ways with racial discrimination. 
Corporations’ push toward automated dispute resolution offers greater 
decision-making uniformity.
212 
Automation offers promise to improve 
distributional outcomes by removing errors and bias introduced by frontline 
human decision makers. This could increase access to justice for some groups, 
such as blacks, who are less likely to enter the civil justice system because they 
believe—as  empirical  studies  indicate—that  they  are  subjected  to  judicial 
 
 
 
207. William B. Rubenstein, The Concept of Equality in Civil Procedure, 23 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1865, 1868 (2002) (“Our procedural systems rest upon the idea that adversarial 
litigants in a single case should be accorded equivalent procedural opportunities and upon the 
proposition that like cases should be processed according to like procedural rules.”). 
208. See Nader, supra note 13; Merzer, supra note 64, at 3 (finding wealthier and 
more educated consumers are more likely to ask for a refund, and wealthier consumers are more likely 
to have their request granted). Cf. Daniela Caruso, The Baby and the Bath Water: The American 
Critique of European Contract Law, 61 AM. J. CORP. L. 479, 498-99 (discussing the private law 
resistance to considering distributional concerns). 
209. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 26, at 1076 (critiquing disparate outcomes that result 
from unequal resources among litigants in private settlement processes); Marc Galanter, Why the 
“Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974); 
Eloise Pasachoff, Special Education, Poverty, and The Limits of Private Enforcement, 86 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1413, 1459 (2011) (concluding that private enforcement mechanisms in special education 
promote inequality). 
210. See supra Section I.B.4. 
211. Some commentators have argued arbitration also leads to inconsistency, though 
that inconsistency is not purposeful. See Kenneth S. Abraham & J.W. Montgomery, The Lawlessness of 
Arbitration, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 355 (2003) (arguing the lack of precedent in arbitration leads to 
inconsistent rulings). But see Weidemaier, supra note 134 (concluding arbitrators use precedent). 
212. U.S. Patent No. 7797212, supra note 62 (“[l]eaving fee refund decisions up to 
individual employees often creates inconsistency in the overall refund policy of a business.”) 
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bias.
213 
By relying on computer algorithms, the corporation may thus avoid 
some forms of racial discrimination ingrained in minds. 
However, if those algorithms provide less redress to consumers with 
smaller savings and lower-income social networks, upward mobility is more 
difficult for all. To the extent these algorithms are viewed more as a component 
of price discrimination, with those paying higher prices receiving better service, 
this differential treatment is more familiar than the analogy to courts would 
imply. However, the resulting private dispute system risks exacerbating socio- 
economic inequality in subtle ways, and thus at the very least is worth 
recognizing as a potential pitfall of the system. Also, because historically 
disadvantaged minorities are more likely to be low-income, the corporations’ 
dispute processes may also overall contribute to racial economic inequality. 
 
3. Inadequate Aggregation Mechanisms 
 
The small amount in controversy may not justify the time required for a 
consumer to complain about or arbitrate a lawful claim. Consumer corporations 
sometimes offer their own internal aggregation mechanisms in response to 
recognized mass harms, and private sector third parties offer some promise for 
aggregation, but these mechanisms are inadequate. This means that even when 
faced with readily available individual complaint processes, large numbers of 
consumers would never obtain redress in the private legal system without the 
existing public backdrop.
214
 
Private actors have created aggregation mechanisms both inside and 
outside the consumer corporation. Private dispute resolution firms that receive 
many complaints drive the aggregation mechanisms lying outside the 
corporation. They then either reach out to consumer companies to obtain 
redress, in a form of collective or automated bargaining, or file a large number 
of arbitration claims.
215 
One startup exemplifying the potential future of private 
sector aggregation, David, asks consumers to provide account information and 
a description of the problem. It then brings typically small-value disputes to 
large telecommunications companies (presumably, Goliaths) such as Comcast, 
 
 
 
 
213. See, e.g., Richard R.W. Brooks & Haekyung Jeon-Slaughter, Race, Income, and 
Perceptions of the U.S. Court System, 19 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 249, 249 (2001) (finding higher-income 
blacks are more skeptical they will be treated equally in the courts, especially in civil cases); Sara 
Sternberg Greene, Race, Class, and Access to Civil Justice (working paper) (concluding blacks’ 
expectations of bias in the civil legal system can prevent them from seeking justice); Jerry Kang et al., 
Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1124, 1131 (2012) (summarizing evidence of 
systematic racial bias in the court system). Cf. Rory Van Loo, A Tale of Two Debtors: Bankruptcy 
Disparities by Race, 72 ALB. L. REV. 231, 231 (2009) (finding that blacks obtain worse results in 
bankruptcy courts and are subject to more motions to dismiss). 
214. For a discussion of public mechanisms for aggregate redress, see infra Section 
III.A.2.  
215. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 3, at 394 (sharing evidence of plaintiff- 
side firms filing ghost class actions in arbitration tribunals). 
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AT&T, Verizon, and Time Warner.
216 
The company collects a small fee— 
thirty percent—only if the dispute is resolved.
217
 
Another aggregation mechanism outside the firm comes from consumers 
organizing through social media.
218 
Consumers have, for example, set up 
Facebook sites to share information as to how to proceed in arbitration or how 
to navigate a company’s customer service process.
219 
This avenue is becoming 
more possible with increasingly automated online dispute processes within 
corporations. 
Like class actions, these external aggregation mechanisms require little 
time to participate. However, they cannot amass plaintiffs who do not opt in.
220
 
It is also unclear whether these mechanisms could provide redress at scale even 
if they could involve most consumers—the corporation could simply refuse to 
cooperate. Thus, in their current forms, from a design perspective, external 
aggregate mechanisms are less powerful than class actions at their best.
221
 
Internally coordinated claim aggregation occurs when the company 
organizes its own mass payout structure.
222 
It may do this after recognizing that 
it has delivered problematic products, or after consumers take to social media 
and complaint venues with sufficient force. But one of the main incentives for 
such a program may be the threat of regulatory enforcement or class actions.
223 
Under Rule 23(b)(3), which requires a class action to be “superior to other 
available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy,” many 
courts have rejected class action suits when the corporation has already set up 
its internal payout system.
224 
There is so far little evidence that internal 
aggregation is viable independent of public mechanisms. 
 
 
 
 
216. See DAVID, www.senddavid.com. A related model can be found at Measured 
Up, which brings consumer complaints to large “partner” companies including Verizon, Walmart, and 
American Express with the goal of resolving disputes. See http://www.measuredup.com. 
217. See DAVID, id. 
218. See generally Jeremy R. McClane, Class Action in the Age of Twitter: A Dispute 
Systems Approach, 19 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 213, 245-46  (2014) (discussing  how social media 
provides consumers with an alternative to class actions). 
219. See id. 
220. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 3, at 94-95 (“[U]nlike traditional class 
action attorneys,  who  frequently  represent thousands  of  plaintiffs,  arbitration entrepreneurs  string 
together a few dozen consumers at most.”). 
221. Granted, courts have similar challenges certifying classes because of the 
difficulty of knowing the identities and similarity of stories for what are usually large groups of 
consumers. See, e.g., Andrew Bradt, “Much to Gain and Nothing to Lose” Implications of the History of 
the Declaratory Judgment for the (b)(2) Class Action, 58 ARK. L. REV. 767, 767 (2006) (describing the 
question of whether to certify a class action as “a troubling problem for both courts and commentators”). 
222. See Jaime Dodge, Disaggregative Mechanisms: Mass-Claims Resolution 
Without Class Actions, 63 EMORY L.J. 1253, 1255 (2014). 
223. See Remus & Zimmerman, supra note 11. 
224. See Eric P. Voight, A Company’s Voluntary Refund Program for Consumers 
Can Be a Fair and Efficient Alternative to a Class Action, 31 REV. LITIG. 617, 620-21 (2012) 
(mentioning nine district courts that have denied class action relief due to corporations’ self-initiated 
refund policies). 
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4. Susceptibility to Market Failures 
 
A dispute system designed and governed largely by market forces rises 
and falls with the level of competition in the underlying market. In particular, 
breakdowns related to three areas may pose challenges to the private consumer 
legal system: market concentration, behavioral economics, and information 
asymmetries. 
Although even monopolists have financial incentives to provide customer 
service, the literature suggests that companies invest less in dispute resolution 
in less concentrated markets.
225 
The “Ma Bell” telephone monopoly that lasted 
until 1984 provides a well-documented historic example of this relationship, 
marked as it was by low customer service.
226 
Today, three out of every four 
homes have only one option for high-speed Internet services, and consumers in 
many parts of the country have few choices for cable.
227 
A Senate Commerce 
Committee investigation found that the absence of competition in the cable 
industry led to “abominable” customer service.
228  
The leading providers of 
cable and  Internet, Comcast and  Time Warner, have  the  lowest customer 
satisfaction among companies in America.
229 
In concentrated markets, 
companies may worry less about their reputation or losing consumers following 
poor dispute resolution because consumers have few (if any) other choices. 
Another category of market failure relates to consumer behavioral biases 
and sophistication deficits. Consumers are rarely represented by counsel during 
small-value dispute processes. Corporations’ customer service settlement 
procedures, on the other hand, are designed by sophisticated lawyers and 
business analysts. The corporation may thereby be able to exploit consumers’ 
cognitive biases, perhaps through a process perceived as fair, to leave them 
 
 
225. See, e.g., Hansen et al., supra note 50, at 9, 12 (“[i]nvestment in complaint 
management is most effective in competitive markets. . . .”); Claes Fornell & Birger Wernerfelt, A 
Model for Customer Complaint Management, 7 MARKETING SCI. 287, 296 (1988) (finding that 
“complaint management is more effective the greater the number of competitors. . . .”). 
226. See, e.g., Robert D. Atkinson, The Role of Competition in a National Broadband 
Policy, 7 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 1, 10 (2009) (mentioning the poor customer service associated 
with the “Ma Bell” monopoly). 
227. See FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, PREPARED REMARKS OF FCC 
CHAIRMAN TOM WHEELER: “THE FACTS AND FUTURE  OF BROADBAND COMPETITION” 4 (Sept. 4, 
2014), https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-329161A1.pdf; Eduardo Porter, 
Concentrated Markets Take Big Toll on Economy, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2014, at B1 (discussing the 
concentrated nature of the cable industry). 
228. See Michael D. Blanchard, Regulated Industries—Statutory Construction of 
Section 541(a) of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992: A 
Presumption in Favor of Practical Reason, 18 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 437, 447 (1996). 
229. See Polly Mosendz, Comcast and Time Warner Are the Most Hated Companies 
in America, THE WIRE, (May 20, 2014) http://www.thewire.com/technology/2014/05/comcast-and-time 
-warner-are-the-most-hated-companies-in-america/371295/; Press Release, Leichtman Research Group, 
Major Pay-TV Providers Added About 10,000 Subscribers in 1Q 2015 (2015), 
http://www.leichtmanresearch.com/press/051415release.html (listing Comcast and Time Warner as the 
leading cable companies by market share); Sig Ueland, 20 Top Internet Service Providers, 
PRACTICALECOMMERCE, (Dec. 12, 2011), http://www.practicalecommerce.com/articles/3225-20-Top 
-Internet-Service-Providers (listing Comcast as the top provider of Internet and Time Warner as third). 
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satisfied with an outcome that gives them less than that which the law, or 
negotiations in good faith, would provide. This is particularly concerning given 
consumer corporations’ growing  sophistication  in  incorporating  behavioral 
economics into their business strategy.
230
 
Finally, there is the possibility of informational market failures. 
Information intermediaries such as reputation-based websites aim to address 
these shortcomings. However, like diamond traders, consumers and companies 
have opportunistically sought to influence reputational mechanisms.
231 
Between 2010 and 2013, the percent of companies with social media programs 
increased from twelve percent to fifty-nine percent.
232 
Though these programs 
are mostly ethical, they can sometimes take an unethical turn. Employees have 
been caught posting positive reviews of their employers’ products without 
disclosing their employment status.
233 
And some companies hire “fake review 
mills” to leave favorable comments.
234
 
In response, corporations have developed mechanisms for policing 
reputation institutions. Websites such as Yelp develop software to monitor 
suspicious activity, such as repeat reviews from the same computer.
235 
Amazon.com mines the personal data of reviewers and removes the review if 
they know the author.
236 
In one case, the retailer repeatedly removed one son’s 
five-star reviews of his mother’s book, and warns that it will “vigorously 
prosecute any attempted manipulation of reviews by suspending or terminating 
accounts,   withholding   remittances,   and   pursuing   civil   and   criminal 
penalties.”
237 
eBay implemented a feedback appeals process for certain types of 
sales, such as automobile transactions, that were particularly ripe for buyer 
 
 
 
 
230. See Rory Van Loo, Helping Buyers Beware: The Need for Supervision of Big 
Retail, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1311 (2015). 
231. See  Bernstein,  Diamond  Industry,  supra  note  21,  at  157  (concluding  that 
diamond industry transactors manipulate the role of reputation institutions because of their influence). 
232. ABERDEEN GROUP, SOCIAL CUSTOMER CARE: SECRETS TO BUILD A WINNING 
STRATEGY (Feb. 16, 2016), http://www.aberdeen.com/research/8578/ra-social-customer 
-service/content.aspx (“[a]doption of social customer care programs increased by approximately five- 
fold between 2010 and 2013 (12% in 2010 vs. 59% in 2013).”). 
233. See Mary Pilon, A Fake Amazon Reviewer Confesses, WALL ST. J. BLOG (July 9, 
2009),      http://blogs.wsj.com/wallet/2009/07/09/delonghis-strange-brew-tracking-down-fake-amazon 
-raves (mentioning employees posting positive reviews of their employers’ products). 
234. See David Streitfeld, In a Race to Out-Rave, 5-Star Web Reviews Go for $5, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2011 (reporting on social brand management companies, also known as fake 
review mills, that offer services such as writing customer reviews). 
235. See  generally  Kaitlin  A.  Dohse,  Fabricating  Feedback:  Blurring  the  Line 
Between Brand Management and Bogus Reviews, 13 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 363, 363 (2013). 
236. See Chris Morran, Amazon Is Data Mining Reviewers’ Personal Relationships, 
CONSUMERIST, July 6, 2015, at https://consumerist.com/2015/07/06/amazon-is-data-mining-reviewers 
-personal-relationships. 
237. See Anti-Manipulation Policy for Customer Reviews, AMAZON, 
http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html/ref=help_search_1 
-1?ie=UTF8&nodeId=201749630&qid=1431546060&sr=1-1; Dohse, supra note 235, at 377 (describing 
how an author’s son had the five-star review of his mother’s book repeatedly removed). 
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exploitation of sellers.
238 
However, as the example of the hotel that tried to fine 
a guest $500 for leaving a negative online review illustrates, the websites 
themselves may not be able to do anything against some strategies.
239  
It is 
questionable whether the private sector alone can succeed in preventing 
misinformation on its websites without public support. 
Finally, there is a collective action problem with network governance. 
Only about four percent of unhappy consumers complain.
240 
If this number is 
too small to matter to companies or to ratings, reputation-based sanctions will 
not work.
241 
Furthermore, information asymmetries may arise when consumers 
do not consult ratings, as in the case of software.
242
 
The risk is that these market failures undermine all of the potential 
advantages of private ordering. Rather than offering low-cost access to redress, 
consumers are made to pay in subtle ways, such as by spending excessive time 
complaining or by having deserved redress denied. Reputation-based sanctions 
no longer hold consumers accountable because information available is 
inaccurate. The perception of procedural justice is used to mask what is, in fact, 
an absence of meaningful participation. In short, when markets fail, the risk is 
that the private consumer legal system fails with it. 
 
III. The Public Backdrop for the Private Consumer Legal System 
 
The above discussion raises the question of what procedural public 
interventions are needed. This Part assesses the existing public backdrop and 
concludes that it is unlikely to address many of the corporate courthouse’s main 
pitfalls. However, the current emphasis on regulation over courts, and direct 
oversight of the most problematic industries, is sensible from a dispute systems 
design perspective. 
 
A. The Current Regulatory Architecture 
 
Although consumer dispute resolution largely unfolds without reference to 
the law or courts, public institutions still overall play a meaningful role. 
Agencies are the most significant public actor. Secondarily, private lawsuits 
offer some redress mostly through class actions, as individual suits even in 
 
 
238. See, e.g., Colin Rule & Harpreet Singh, ODR and Online Reputation Systems: 
Maintaining Trust and Accuracy Through Effective Redress, in ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THEORY 
AND PRACTICE 163 (Mohamed S. Abdel Wahab et al. eds., 2013) (describing buyer exploitation of used 
car sellers by threatening to leave negative reviews). 
239. See supra note 174. 
240. See Jerry Plymire, Complaints as Opportunities, 5 J. SERVS. MARKETING 61 
(1991).  
241. Those four percent could comprise most of the reviewing population, in which 
case companies will care more than that small number suggests, assuming it is impossible for companies 
to distinguish that four percent. See infra Part IV.A. 
242. See Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 152, at 184 (finding consumers rarely consult 
ratings for software purchases). 
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small claims cases amount to a small fraction of consumer contractual disputes 
handled by companies.
243
 
 
1. Direct Agency Oversight 
 
A patchwork of state and federal legislation provides for direct agency 
involvement in corporate dispute processes in many industries. Legislatures 
have focused this oversight on industries with high concentration or cause for 
concern about behavioral economics-related practices—such as airline, cable, 
and finance.
244 
This indicates the potential for the legislative process, relying 
on agencies, to respond when markets fail to produce sufficient dispute 
resolution. 
Federal legislation tasks airlines with maintaining certain minimum 
customer service standards, including “ensuring responsiveness to consumer 
problems” and “handling ‘bumped’ passengers with fairness and consistency in 
the case of over-sales.”
245 
The statute relies on a self-monitoring approach, in 
which the airlines keep customer service records available for audit by the 
Department of Transportation (DOT).
246 
For example, the DOT recently fined 
Delta $375,000 when a review of internal complaint data revealed that the 
airline had regularly bumped passengers without first seeking volunteers and 
without offering compensation.
247
 
Federal laws also require financial institutions to resolve disputes 
promptly, maintain accurate complaint records, and have systems to correct any 
legal violations causing complaints.
248 
Bank examiners from the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) regularly collect data about the complaint 
process at a very abstracted level, such as the time for dispute resolution, to 
ensure that banks are complying with these specific laws.
249
 
In the case of the cable industry, Congress required the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) to “establish standards by which cable 
operators  may  fulfill  their  customer  service  requirements.”
250   
The  FCC 
 
 
 
 
243. See Arbitration Study, supra note 157, at §1 p. 15, §7 pp. 10-12 (finding only 
870 cases filed by consumers against credit card issuers in districts representing approximately one-fifth 
of the United States). Most arbitration provisions contain small claims carve-outs. See id. at 1.4.6. 
244. See  Porter,  supra  note  227  (describing  concentration  in  airline  and  cable 
industries).  
245. 14 C.F.R. § 259.5(b) (2011). 
246. See id. § 259.5(c). 
247. See Delta Fined for Treatment of Passengers It Had Bumped, N.Y. TIMES, June 
26,   2013,   http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/27/business/delta-air-lines-fined-for-mishandling-bumped 
-passengers.html. 
248. CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, CFPB SUPERVISION AND EXAMINATION 
MANUAL 12 (Oct. 2012); Telephone Interview with M.L. (June 8, 2015). 
249. See Telephone Interview with M.L. (June 8, 2015). 
250. 47 U.S.C. § 552(b). The enumerated requirements include standards governing 
“refunds” and “telephone availability.” See id. 
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responded by issuing detailed standards such as requiring the cable company to 
issue refunds within 30 days or in the next billing cycle.
251
 
The health insurance sector in some regards has the most far-reaching 
oversight. The Affordable Care Act ensures not only an internal process by 
which patients can appeal insurer plan decisions, but also establishes an 
external body to which the patient can appeal final internal decisions. This 
external process is run by a private contractor and overseen by the Department 
of Health and Human Services.
252
 
Overall, most agencies have taken a minimum standards approach to their 
delegated authority to oversee customer service. This floor for customer service 
typically covers concrete issues such as the time taken to resolve disputes. 
However, they do not speak to the process by which disputes are resolved. 
Furthermore, many industries have no such federal standards for customer 
service, and states have filled the gaps only in very limited contexts.
253
 
 
2. Filling the Aggregation Gap: Agencies and Class Actions 
 
The importance of providing aggregate redress has often led reformers to 
conclude that without class actions companies will not be held accountable for 
small harms. However, these analyses typically focus on the dichotomy 
between courts and arbitration, while leaving out a more important mechanism 
for aggregate redress: the administrative agency.
254
 
Courts play an increasingly limited role in aggregating small-value 
contractual disputes between consumers and companies due to the rise of 
mandatory arbitration. Nonetheless, they still do provide relief. For example, a 
recent CFPB study found consumers obtained $370 million annually through 
all federal class actions for major consumer financial products such as credit 
cards, bank accounts, and mortgages.
255
 
 
 
 
251. See Customer Service Standards, FED. COMM. COMM’N (April 2, 2012), 
https://www.fcc.gov/media/customer-service-standards. The agency did not provide any standards 
related to the process by which refunds are decided. 
252. See, e.g., CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES,  HHS- 
ADMINISTERED FEDERAL EXTERNAL REVIEW PROCESS FOR HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE, 
https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Programs-and-Initiatives/Consumer-Support-and-Information/csg-ext 
-appeals-facts.html. Congress has also mandated internal claims procedures for ERISA disputes. See 29 
C.F.R. §§ 2560.503-1 (1999). 
253. For example, California and New York mandate that issuers of pre-paid calling 
cards offer complaint-handling services. See Mark E. Budnitz et al., Deceptive Claims for Prepaid 
Telephone Cards and the Need for Regulation, 19 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 1, 25 (2006). 
254. See, e.g., CFPB, supra note 202 (analyzing aggregate redress without 
considering how much relief is provided by agencies); See CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, 
CFPB STUDY FINDS THAT ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS LIMIT RELIEF FOR CONSUMERS (March 10, 
2015),      http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/cfpb-study-finds-that-arbitration-agreements-limit 
-relief-for-consumers  (concluding  based  on  study  of  class  actions  that  mandatory  arbitration  is 
problematic). 
255. See CFPB, supra note 202, at 2-3 (listing total arbitration awards during the 
three-year period as $400,000, and for class actions as $1.1 billion). 
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Because over the same period consumers received $133,000 annually in 
arbitration awards, or less than one-tenth the amount from class actions, the 
CFPB concluded that mandatory arbitration clauses limit consumer relief.
256
 
This conclusion—a version of which is common in the legal literature— 
overlooks the role of consumer agencies in providing aggregate redress.
257 
Indeed, the CFPB’s enforcement lawyers alone have brought about $2.5 billion 
annually in monetary relief to consumers, or more than six times the amount 
from class actions.
258 
Other agencies and state attorneys general also obtain 
billions in awards for consumers annually in the financial sector.
259 
Consequently, in industries with active regulatory agencies, strong deterrence 
can be obtained without class actions. As one former mid-level manager of a 
multi-billion dollar company put it, “A class action for $10 million dollars is no 
big deal—we could pay them off without batting an eye. But the risk of 
regulators coming down on us makes people nervous.”
260
 
Thus, the current public backdrop provides large amounts of aggregate 
redress and strong deterrence mostly through regulation, and secondarily (and 
decreasingly)
261 
through class actions. Moreover, at least in the consumer 
context, reliance on regulation rather than class actions is theoretically 
preferable from a systems design perspective. Although regulation has 
substantial limitations,
262 
it is overall preferable because it can advance 
society’s interests in aggregate dispute resolution at lower cost and greater 
effectiveness. 
In terms of costs, with litigation, both consumers and corporations spend 
considerable resources on lawyers’ fees. By way of illustration, the CFPB in its 
study  found  that  about  eighteen  percent  of  settlement  awards  went  to 
 
 
 
 
256. See CFPB STUDY FINDS THAT ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS LIMIT RELIEF FOR 
CONSUMERS, supra note 254. 
257. See, e.g., CFPB, supra note 202 (studying the question of whether class actions 
are needed without considering the role of agencies in providing aggregate relief); Fitzpatrick, supra 
note 7, at 161 (concluding class actions are needed without considering agency relief). Nowhere in the 
CFPB’s report is there any consideration of the aggregate relief provided by agencies. 
258. See CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, ENFORCING CONSUMER 
PROTECTION   LAWS   (2015),  http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201507_cfpb_enforcing-consumer 
-protection-laws.pdf (reporting CFPB enforcement actions obtained $10 billion in relief between 2011 
and 2015). 
259. See, e.g., Christina Rexrode & Andrew Grossman, BofA Accord Ends a Long 
Legal Drama, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 2014, at C.1 (discussing a Department of Justice settlement 
requiring Bank of America to pay seven billion dollars to consumers). Cf. Margaret H. Lemos, 
Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Representative Suits by State Attorneys General, 126 HARV. L. REV. 
486, 499-500 (2012) (describing the similar role of state attorney general aggregate litigation and private 
class actions). 
260. Telephone Interview with L.B. (Aug. 5, 2015). Of course, a regime could be 
constructed in which class actions caused more fear than regulation. 
261. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick, supra note 7, at 161 (“I still see every reason to believe 
that businesses will eventually be able to eliminate virtually all class actions that are brought against 
them. . . .”). 
262. See infra Section III.B. 
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attorneys.
263 
By contrast, the CFPB enforcement group’s salaries amount to 
roughly two percent of the awards it obtains for consumers.
264 
Also, plaintiff- 
side lawyers have financial self-interest in bringing bad faith claims against 
deep-pocketed companies.
265 
Granted, reputational interests and institutional 
financial incentives may also cause regulators to over-reach.
266 
However, 
research suggests that regulatory employees’ financial self-interests lead to 
under-enforcement in some industries, which may help secure lucrative 
business jobs later.
267 
Thus, resolving disputes through regulation rather than 
class actions reduces costs from frivolous lawsuits. While lower costs are 
beneficial for many reasons, corporations likely pass on some of these savings 
to consumers in the form of lower prices.
268
 
Regulation  as  an  aggregate  mechanism  also  advances  other  societal 
interests such as truth, justice and community norms. Courts are institutionally 
ill-equipped for the economic analyses involved in transactional consumer 
disputes.
269 
Instead, they rely on heuristics such as inferring compliance from 
the defendant’s institutional structure.
270 
Regulators, by contrast, have deep 
economic expertise and familiarity with consumer markets.
271 
Decisions by a 
more competent regulatory decision maker advance society’s interest in 
accuracy and in avoiding injustices such as haphazard class action awards. 
At its best, the administrative agency can also promote procedural justice, 
autonomy, and collaborative relations. The ideal for regulators is for companies 
 
 
263. See CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, supra note 153 at 17. 
264. The CFPB has obtained $2.5 billion annually in relief for consumers from 
enforcement actions. See supra note 258. CFPB enforcement attorneys cost taxpayers about $45 million 
annually, if it is assumed that they use a proportional amount of agency resources. See CONSUMER FIN. 
PROTECTION BUREAU, PROGRAM SUMMARY BY BUDGET ACTIVITY (2012), 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/2012/02/budget-in-brief.pdf (reporting a projected CFPB budget of 
$448 million); Email from AV (Aug. 10, 2015) (stating enforcement makes up ten percent of the 
agency’s employees). The two percent figure is calculated as (448*.1)/2,500=.02. 
265. See, e.g., Bone & Evans, supra note 161, at 1314 (estimating thirty percent of 
class action filings are frivolous); Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. 
Amchem Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1045 (1995) (criticizing plaintiff attorneys for advancing 
their own interests over those of class members). Bad-faith suits are not specific to class actions. See 
Joanna C. Schwartz, The Cost of Suing Business, 65 DEPAUL L. REV.     (forthcoming 2016). 
266. See Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For-Profit Public Enforcement, 127 
HARV. L. REV. 853, 854 (2014) (arguing reputational and institutional monetary incentives may drive 
regulators to seek excessive monetary awards). 
267. See, e.g., Severin Borenstein et al., Career Concerns, Inaction and Market 
Inefficiency: Evidence from Utility Regulation, 60 J. INDUSTRIAL ECON. 220 (2012) (concluding the data 
are consistent with career prospects discouraging regulators from warranted regulatory actions). 
268. See supra note 164. 
269. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1, 74 (2008) (arguing courts lack the institutional competence to monitor fast-changing consumer 
markets). 
270. See Lauren Edelman et al., When Organizations Rule: Judicial Deference to 
Institutionalized Employment Structures, 117 AM. J. SOC. 888, 888 (2011) (describing courts’ tendency 
to defer to institutional structure to infer nondiscrimination). 
271. The FTC, for example, has a Bureau of Economics with seventy Ph.D.-level 
economists. See Matthew A. Edwards, The FTC And New Paternalism, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 323, 353 
(2008). 
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to self-regulate, although this goal is often overlooked.
272 
Self-regulation means 
that the corporation analyzes the legality of its own actions and arranges 
aggregate payouts to consumers when it identifies violations, rather than 
requiring public courts or agencies to compel such action.
273 
To this end, 
regulators often develop ongoing relationships with regulated companies. Such 
close ties are concerning because of the potential for capture.
274 
But they also 
likely enable dispute resolution that is less alienating than adversarial court 
proceedings. Ongoing relations enable regulators to correct and prevent 
harmful practices outside the formal legal process—without ever bringing an 
enforcement action.
275 
They simply tell the company that it needs to fix the 
practice and compensate consumers, potentially allowing the corporation to 
manage its own aggregate payout plan.
276 
If designed well, this approach can 
promote autonomy and procedural justice for the corporation and its 
employees. 
Moreover, when regulators encourage corporations to provide refunds, the 
result would presumably be to strengthen the relationship between the 
corporation and consumer. Whereas class actions are alienating and enable 
plaintiff-side lawyers to control much of the communications with the 
consumers, with regulatory intervention the corporation often administers the 
payouts and serves as the sole source of contact with the consumer.
277 
The 
corporation’s continued ownership of the refund relationship can build trust and 
relations between consumers and corporations. Cooperative regulation thus 
offers the promise to strengthen the type of collaborative relations and 
solidarity that some scholars have argued are at the heart of contract law, and of 
the economy.
278
 
 
 
 
 
 
272. See, e.g., Jean Braucher & Angela Littwin, Examination as a Method of 
Consumer Protection, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 807, 808 (2015) (highlighting the goal of self-regulation in the 
CFPB); Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate: Toward Financial Industry Self- 
Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411, 413 (2011) (arguing that “[o]ne key and currently overlooked 
potential mechanism for controlling and minimizing systemic financial risk is industry-wide self- 
regulation.”). 
273. This concept is related to but distinct from self-regulatory organizations (SROs), 
which are third-party private entities that sometimes serve to regulate industries. See, e.g., Stavros 
Gadinis & Howell E. Jackson, Markets As Regulators: A Survey, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239 (2007) 
(surveying SROs in securities regulation). 
274. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through 
Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 16-18 (2010). 
275. See Van Loo, supra note 230 (discussing consumer agencies’ ability to collect 
information outside the legal process more efficiently). 
276. See, e.g., Remus & Zimmerman, supra note 11, at 133. 
277. See, e.g., Deborah Hensler, Justice for the Masses? Aggregate Litigation & Its 
Alternatives, DAEDALUS, Summer 2014, at 81 (“grumbling on websites devoted to specific mass 
litigations suggest [plaintiffs in mass torts] are often unhappy and distrustful of their own lawyers, the 
defendants, and the courts.”). 
278. See supra Section II.A.4 (discussing Markovits’s theory of contract law and 
relations between corporations and consumers). 
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Of course, the choice between regulation and class actions as aggregate 
mechanisms is not binary—the two could play a complementary role.
279 
Courts 
also provide advantages that regulators do not, such as a resistance to capture 
and a potentially more powerful symbolic effect.
280 
The broader point here is 
one that is often omitted from discussions on procedural privatization: even 
under a mandatory arbitration regime, consumers currently have access to 
aggregate redress through the consumer agency. Furthermore, if regulation is 
functioning effectively, reliance on regulation rather than class actions may 
lower enforcement costs and overall be better for consumers. 
 
3. Regulators and Complaints 
 
Like rural residents whose land has been trespassed by cattle,
281 
after 
direct negotiations fail consumers sometimes contact public officials directly. 
Agencies receive hundreds of thousands of complaints from consumers each 
year.
282 
Regulatory complaint processing serves two main functions with 
respect to the corporation as courthouse: to provide an alternative remedy and 
to influence how corporations handle complaints. 
One purpose of regulatory consumer complaint mechanisms may be to 
offer a “remedial tool to make up for shortcomings in the courts.”
283 
Given that 
the corporation is the de facto courthouse for most consumer contractual 
disputes, regulatory complaint processing also can make up for shortcomings in 
corporations’ internal dispute processes.
284  
For example, the CFPB takes a 
proactive role by forwarding complaints to companies and following up to see 
how those complaints were resolved.
285 
A recent analysis found that following 
the launch of the CFPB’s complaint department, consumers gradually disputed 
financial companies’ responses less, which is consistent with consumers 
viewing those responses as more satisfactory.
286 
Anecdotally, consumers have 
 
 
279. One potential justification for class actions is that they spur regulators to act. 
Increased regulation can result from litigation. See Fleming, supra note 80 (chronicling how Williams v. 
Walker-Thomas Furniture Co. led to consumer protection legal reform). However, greater market 
monitoring may be obtainable at lower costs simply by regulators hiring more examiners, or monitoring 
more consumer complaints. See infra Part IV.B. 
280. See infra Section III.B (considering the implications of capture). 
281. See Ellickson, supra note 21, at 679 (describing how ranchette owners 
sometimes respond to an incident by contacting a public official such as a county supervisor or animal 
control officer). They may take this step either because direct negotiation proves inadequate, or out of a 
belief that it will get better results. See id. 
282. See, e.g., Littwin, supra note 88, at fig.4 (analyzing over three hundred thousand 
complaints in the CFPB database over a recent two-year period). 
283. See Porter, supra note 49, at 77. 
284. Cf. Littwin, supra note 88, (analyzing the CFPB’s complaint process as “a forum 
for resolving consumer issues that might not otherwise be addressed.”). 
285. See Porter, supra note 49, at 67 (describing how complaints are flagged for 
investigation if the financial institution does not close the complaint in a timely manner); Ayres et al., 
supra note 83, at 368-69 (finding significant variations in banks’ speed of processing complaints). 
286. See Littwin, supra note 88, at 922, fig.1. The study did not allow for causality to 
be determined. 
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noted faster responses when the CFPB forwards complaints.
287 
Furthermore, 
many banks process complaints from the CFPB in an executive customer 
service group that provides more attentive complaint handling.
288  
Regulatory 
complaints may thus trigger an alternative path to redress within financial 
institutions, providing relief to tens of thousands of consumers each year.
289 
Regulatory complaints are another overlooked appeal mechanism outside the 
courts. 
The second main procedural function of regulatory complaints is to more 
generally influence corporations’ complaint processes even for consumers who 
do not complain.
290 
Using advanced software—such as the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC)’s Consumer Sentinel—agencies analyze these complaints 
to identify trends and highlight areas for further investigation and possibly 
regulatory action.
291 
For example, unlike the FTC, the CFPB posts complaint 
data online.
292 
Approximately eighty-five percent of complaints submitted to 
the CFPB are first submitted directly to the company but left unresolved.
293 
Consequently, financial institutions improve their complaint handling to make 
unwanted regulatory and public attention less likely. For example, after the 
CFPB public database initially revealed large discrepancies among banks, some 
institutions revamped their customer service departments and tied executive 
compensation to  the  bank’s performance  in  that database  relative  to  their 
peers.
294
 
 
 
287. See, e.g., CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, CONSUMER RESPONSE 
ANNUAL  REPORT  1  (2014),  http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_consumer-response-annual 
-report-2014.pdf (quoting a consumer noting faster resolution for complaints forwarded by the agency). 
288. See Wieczner, supra note 115. 
289. See Littwin, supra note 88, at 904, 913 (describing the consumer regulatory 
complaint process as providing access to justice and finding that about one in five of 174,095 complaints 
forwarded by the CFPB in a recent two-year period resulted in relief). It is unknown how many of these 
would have obtained relief otherwise, but eighty-five percent of those in the database had previously 
asked for relief directly to the company, and the average consumer had asked three times. See Interview 
with S.N. (May 28, 2015). Taking eighty-five percent of one in five consumers out of the 174,095 would 
amount to about thirty thousand consumers. 
290. Ayres et al., supra note 83, at 369 (concluding that companies should heed the 
early results of the CFPB’s complaints database and “[s]trive to improve their response processes for all 
consumers.”) 
291. See FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, AT&T to Pay $80 Million to FTC for Consumer 
Refunds in Mobile Cramming Case (Oct. 8, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press 
-releases/2014/10/att-pay-80-million-ftc-consumer-refunds-mobile-cramming-case (describing 
Consumer Sentinel as “a secure, online database available to more than 2,000 civil and criminal law 
enforcement agencies in the U.S. and abroad.”); CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, CFPB 
SUPERVISION AND EXAMINATION MANUAL,         at         Overview         7         (2012), 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201210_cfpb_supervision-and-examination-manual-v2.pdf      (describing 
how a high volume of complaints may result in a targeted examination); Littwin, supra note 88,             
at 925 (concluding the CFPB uses complaint data for regulation). 
292. See Littwin, supra note 88, at 895. 
293. Telephone Interview with S.N. (May 28, 2015); Littwin, supra note 88, at 922 
(noting the average consumer went to the company three times before submitting a CFPB complaint). 
294. See CONSUMER RESPONSE ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 287 (“Many companies 
are adapting to [the CFPB’s focus on complaints] to become more directly responsive to consumer 
concerns.”); Ayres et al., supra note 83 (finding discrepancies among banks in the public database); 
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Regulatory complaints offer several other benefits from a systems 
perspective. They make it more likely that regulators will identify market 
failures related to concentrated industries, since such market failures—more 
than for those related to behavioral economics and information asymmetries— 
would be expected to still generate complaints. By posting complaints online, 
regulators also offer an information intermediary that may be difficult to co-opt 
with misinformation. Finally, regulatory complaints give consumers a voice in 
the regulatory process. By providing another avenue for consumers to feel 
heard, regulators may contribute to the consumer legal system’s legitimacy and 
make  consumers  more  likely  to  engage  in  value-maximizing  economic 
transactions.
295
 
 
B. Limitations of the Current Regulatory Architecture 
 
The public backdrop for the private consumer legal system has three main 
categories of limitations. First, its main actor, the consumer regulator, lacks the 
information it needs to address certain pitfalls of the corporation as courthouse. 
Second, it is unclear whether the system is adequately preserving reputation 
intermediaries. Third, because the public backdrop relies so heavily on 
regulation, it is vulnerable to the limitations inherent in that institution, such as 
capture. 
Agencies are inadequately informed above all because they rely mostly on 
regulatory complaints or vague aggregate company reports for information 
about how corporations make dispute resolution decisions.
296 
Regulators do not 
collect information from corporations to analyze their decision-making criteria. 
Instead, regulators mostly only check that the company is complying with the 
specific requirements of the law, which have remained static for years.
297 
This 
means that problematic dispute resolution practices about which consumers are 
unaware—such  as  the  use  of  familial  wealth—would  go  undetected  by 
regulators unless they became public knowledge. Furthermore, agencies pay 
almost no attention to functions outside the customer service department, such 
as the corporation’s role in handling hundreds of millions of disputes in 
network trials.
298
 
 
 
 
Telephone Interview with S.N. (May 28, 2015) (stating that companies have arranged compensation to 
reflect performance in the CFPB’s public complaint database). 
295. Cf. TYLER, supra note 17 (finding empirical evidence that voice is an important 
component of perceptions of legitimacy). The lack of a voice is also theorized as an obstacle to 
collaborative contractual relations. See MARKOVITS, supra note 14, at 1422-23. 
296. See supra Sections III.A.1, III.A.2. 
297. See supra Section III.A.1. 
298. Telephone Interview with M.L (June 8, 2015) (stating that the CFPB does not 
look at chargebacks). The FTC, the primary regulator of online intermediary companies such as Airbnb 
and Amazon, does not regularly collect information about companies’ complaint processes. Cf. Van 
Loo, supra note 230, at 1381 (describing the FTC’s general lack of collection of private information 
from companies). 
593 
Rory Van Loo, The Corporation as Courthouse, 33 YALE J. REG. 547 (2016). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Second, public actors pay inadequate attention to reputation websites. As 
mentioned above, it is likely that reputation websites themselves will prove 
unable to police sellers’ efforts to provide misinformation.
299 
Because agencies 
pay almost no attention to reputation websites, courts are currently the only 
option. Amazon, despite its substantial internal efforts to police reviews, is 
currently suing numerous websites that post fake reviews, such as the 
incautiously named BuyAmazonReviews.com.
300 
Fake reviews can be fought 
on legal grounds including consumer protection statutes preventing unfair and 
deceptive practices, and unfair competition.
301 
However, sellers’ fast-changing, 
innovative efforts to avoid the limits of the law raise questions about courts’ 
ability to keep up. For example, instead of directly instructing writers to write 
favorable reviews, sellers ask hired writers not to provide feedback unless they 
will provide five-star reviews.
302 
It is unclear whether the law is set to prevent 
these and other practices such as the hotel’s contract clause requiring the 
consumer to pay five hundred dollars for leaving a negative review online.
303 
Moreover, no entity is regularly inquiring into how Amazon, Yelp, and other 
companies may be influencing their internal ratings systems for profit without 
consumers’ knowledge, rather than simply policing reviews of products sold by 
third parties.
304
 
Finally, a system that relies so heavily on regulation for its public dispute 
resolution faces institutional limits of the agency. These limits include the risk 
of over- or under-enforcement. Furthermore, agencies can become under- 
resourced or captured, depriving consumer markets of their primary public 
dispute resolution actor. 
 
IV. Policy Considerations 
 
This Article’s main purpose is to illuminate the institutions that govern the 
vast majority of consumer disputes. Nonetheless, a discussion of reforms is 
merited given the preliminary evidence of pitfalls in the private order and 
limitations in its public backdrop. Also, legal scholars, legislators, and agencies 
 
 
 
299. See supra Section II.B.4. 
300. See George Anderson, Amazon Lawsuit Takes on Fake Reviewers, FORBES, 
April 13, 2015. 
301. See id.; Dohse, supra note 235. 
302. See Streitfeld, supra note 234. 
303. See supra note 174. However, California has passed anti-gag legislation, and 
there are signs federal legislators may pass similar legislation. See Chris Morran, Complain All You 
Want, California! State Outlaws Silly Non-Disparagement Clauses, CONSUMERIST (Sept. 10, 2014) 
http://consumerist.com/2014/09/10/complain-all-you-want-california-state-outlaws-silly-non 
-disparagement-clauses. 
304. Although regulators have been slow to enter this arena, the FTC has said that 
online writers such as bloggers must disclose any conflict of interest, such as having received a free 
product. See Stephanie Schwab, Disclosures for Bloggers and Brands, SOCIAL MEDIA EXPLORER (Apr. 
24,   2013),   http://www.socialmediaexplorer.com/social-media-marketing/disclosures-for-bloggers-and 
-brands. 
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have paid intense attention in recent years to the question of how to improve 
consumer dispute resolution. Yet those conversations have rarely considered 
consumer-facing corporations’ internal processes. This Part considers how a 
reform analysis might proceed in light of a broader perspective on private 
ordering. 
As a threshold matter, any proposal for improving consumer dispute 
resolution should be assessed by how it would interact with the existing private 
and public actors. To have as substantial an impact as possible, it would need 
to affect the institutional heart of the consumer legal system—the corporation’s 
internal dispute institutions. To have a net positive impact, it would need to 
improve on the current regulatory architecture. At its best, the web of 
corporations in their interlocking courthouse roles currently provides a strong 
framework for dispute resolution. Competitive forces are in some markets 
driving the corporation toward providing more collaborative, low-cost, and 
responsive access to justice. The current regulatory architecture demonstrates a 
strong preference for allowing the private order to flourish largely unchecked. 
When public intervention is needed to resolve small-value consumer disputes, 
the preferred mechanism is currently public enforcement actions rather than 
private lawsuits. 
In light of the existing system’s strengths and limitations, several 
principles would help gauge whether a proposed regulatory architecture might 
overall improve the system. First, public intervention should rely on the 
economic incentives of firms as much as possible. This reliance would mean 
defaulting whenever possible to private ordering and its mainstays: business 
self-governance, adjudication by other firms, and reputation-based 
enforcement. A heavy reliance on private ordering is unavoidable because 
small-value consumer disputes cannot cover the costs of expensive resolution 
processes. The more the firm acts to improve dispute resolution on its own, 
without involving a public sector third party, the less the regulatory regime will 
cost, and the greater the potential for good faith contractual renegotiation that 
might otherwise prove unadministrable. A corollary to this principle is that any 
regulatory architecture must be dynamic—able to adjust as the private sector 
improves or worsens its dispute resolution in accordance with procedural 
experimentalism. 
Second, the new regime would ideally provide regular visibility into 
businesses’ internal operations, because they change rapidly and lack 
transparency. The idea would be to remove the blind spots of reputation-based 
sanctions rather than to replace them. Third, the regulatory architecture should 
prioritize public decision makers with general economic expertise and textured 
industry knowledge. Relevant background will help decision makers discern 
the complex interplay between market failures and justice. Finally, it would be 
preferable to minimize the risks of over-reliance on the administrative agency 
in light of the potential for capture and poor performance. 
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The discussion below offers several concrete policy ideas that meet these 
general criteria. These ideas include (1) ensuring informed administrative 
agencies that understand companies’ internal dispute processes, (2) leveraging 
the informational power of complaints, and (3) sunrise class actions. The list is 
not meant to be exhaustive or final. Indeed, other public reforms such as online 
dispute resolution linked to public courts may yet prove promising. Instead, the 
reform ideas below are offered because they have potential to improve the 
existing regulatory architecture in ways that existing proposals do not, and they 
serve to illustrate the kind of recommendations that flow from a more holistic 
systems analysis of consumer disputes. The end state would ideally not be more 
regulation, but more sophisticated regulation tailored to the private ordering in 
place. 
 
A. Regulatory  Supervision 
 
Agencies have the statutory authority to play a larger role in addressing 
the pitfalls of the private consumer legal system. The two main consumer 
agencies, the FTC and the CFPB, have the ability to collect information that 
would enable them to determine how companies decide on disputes, as part of 
their   larger   information   collection   authority   for   consumer   protection 
purposes.
305  
Yet they and other agencies rarely do so.
306  
If agencies were to 
collect the information necessary to identify problematic dispute resolution 
practices, they would have many options for taking action. In some instances, 
agencies may conclude no action is necessary because markets are sufficiently 
moving corporations in the right direction.
307 
If not, agencies could promulgate 
rules, inform consumers, informally ask corporations to self-monitor, open a 
legal  case,
308   
or  lobby  Congress  for  new  industry  standards.
309   
The  most 
 
 
 
305. This authority comes from their broader information collection authority. See 
The FTC’s Annual Line-of-Business Reporting Program, 1975 DUKE L.J. 389, 394-96 (1975) 
(describing how courts have interpreted the FTC’s information collection powers expansively, including 
for the collection of non-public information from firms); Braucher & Littwin, supra note 272, at 19 
(explaining the CFPB’s “broad information-gathering capabilities”). 
306. The closest to this is the DOT’s auditing of complaint data to ensure airlines 
seek volunteers before bumping passengers. See supra Section III.A.1. The CFPB’s examination arm 
does not inquire into how banks resolve complaints, but does look into the timeliness of complaint 
resolution and expects processes that enable banks to identify legal violations unearthed through the 
complaint process. Telephone Interview with M.L. (June 8, 2015). 
307. See supra Section I.A. 
308. Cases might be brought on a number of legal grounds, including unfair and 
deceptive acts and the doctrine of good faith. See MARKOVITS, supra note 14, at 1321 (mentioning the 
possibility of courts conceiving of customer service in accordance with contract principles analogous to 
the duty of good faith in performance); Eric G. Anderson, Good Faith in the Enforcement of Contracts, 
73 IOWA L. REV. 299, 301 (1988) (noting that the doctrine of good faith “[a]ccounts for many cases in 
which courts have, or should have, declined to enforce an express contractual condition and illustrates 
that a number of decisions in which courts have cited public policy reasons for refusing to enforce a 
contract can be justified more satisfactorily by a good faith doctrine that respects, rather than trumps, 
freedom of contract.”); Van Loo, supra note 230, at 1373-74 (explaining how federal agency powers to 
regulate unfair acts is broad and would likely apply to behaviorally based practices). 
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immediate question is whether and how agencies should use their information 
collection authority. 
The most appropriate mechanism for such information collection is 
through supervision powers rather than enforcement powers. Despite the 
implications of heavy-handedness implicit in the name, supervision can be a 
particularly light regulatory mechanism by which non-lawyer examiners collect 
information periodically  outside the legal process  to enable informed 
decisionmaking.
310 
Supervision is a form of “responsive regulation” aimed at 
self-monitoring.
311 
Indeed, the current minimal regulatory structure for 
complaints in the airline industry, which relies on self-monitoring and retention 
of reports that the DOT can audit, is a form of supervision.
312 
Greater 
supervision of complaint handling could involve as little as having one non- 
lawyer regulatory employee conduct two-hour interviews with a few companies 
in an industry each year to determine how the companies’ dispute algorithms 
work. Or it could involve more regular randomized spot check collection of 
data, such as internal decision trees used by customer service. Any such 
preliminary data collection could then form the basis for deciding whether 
further supervision or other action is warranted. 
Regardless of the specific type and quantity of information collection, the 
larger point is that the FTC and the CFPB could use their supervisory powers 
periodically to stay up-to-date on how corporations adjudicate consumer 
disputes in various industries, ideally in partnership with other agencies such as 
the DOT and FCC.
313  
Because widespread frequent supervision of diverse 
industries is impractical and unnecessary, supervisory efforts should target 
problematic industries and the most valuable information. Signs that an 
industry is potentially more problematic include higher consumer costs of 
 
 
 
 
309. J. Maria Glover has proposed Federal Rules of Civil Settlement that would align 
pretrial settlements more closely with the law. See J. Maria Glover, The Federal Rules  of Civil 
Settlement, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1713, 1713 (2012). An analogous idea could be developed for even non- 
lawyers handling consumer disputes regardless of whether a trial is feasible. Alternatively, ethics 
standards could be developed for those who design dispute resolution systems. See Carrie Menkel- 
Meadow, Are There Systemic Ethics Issues in Dispute System Design? And What We Should (Not) Do 
About It: Lessons from International and Domestic Fronts, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 195, 198 (2009) 
(discussing the possibility of a “separate set of ethics standards or guidelines for those who design 
‘systems’ of dispute resolution for institutions. . . .”). 
310. One reason why supervision is sometimes associated with heavy regulation is 
that its deployment in the financial sector involves regular on-site examinations and collection of large 
volumes of financial information from institutions, a process often seen by banks as oppressive. See 
Julie A. Hill, When Bank Examiners Get It Wrong: Financial Institution Appeals of Material 
Supervisory Determinations, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1101 (2015) (describing financial sector regulatory 
supervision and identifying significant contributors to dissatisfaction with examinations). See also Van 
Loo, supra note 230 (proposing a light-touch supervision model for consumer goods in contrast to the 
heavier model in consumer finance). 
311. See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: 
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE, 101-05 (1992). 
312. See 14 C.F.R. § 259.5(c) (2011). 
313. See id. 
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switching between competitors, a lack of continuing relationships, and high 
market  concentration.
314
 
The idea of supervising complaint processes requires further development, 
and the costs of such a program would need to be weighed carefully. For 
example, even minimal supervision involves costs, and it would be 
counterproductive if corporations responded by halting collection of complaint 
data. However, given the size of most large consumer corporations, the 
expenses of complying with a light-touch supervisory program would likely be 
minimal. Moreover, informed regulators make it possible to address the pitfalls 
of the corporate courthouse without more costly involvement of public courts. 
 
B. Leveraging the Informational Power of Complaints 
 
Given the many ways that businesses aim to undermine consumer 
complaints, reputation-based sanctions might need public support. Although 
legislative action could prove useful, such as a non-confidentiality law limiting 
companies’ ability to put gag orders on consumers,
315 
this section explores two 
possible non-legislative improvements to reputation-based sanctions that are 
within regulators’ current mandate: (1) digitally monitoring a larger universe of 
private sector complaint data, and (2)  enhanced regulatory complaint 
processing. 
Regulators could potentially integrate data from a variety of websites, 
such as Yelp, Amazon, and Google, to develop a form of meta-complaint 
intelligence about the complaint universe. A larger-scale version of this 
complaint network would also draw on corporations’ internal complaint data— 
such as American Airlines’ or Citibank’s—if possible to do so without great 
expense to the corporation and while protecting the privacy of consumers. 
Regardless of which sources it linked to, this meta-complaint database could be 
used, first, to improve the informational power of regulators’ complaint 
analysis software.  Regulatory complaints constitute a tiny fraction of 
complaints submitted to companies—perhaps one complaint is submitted to 
regulators for every two hundred or more submitted to companies.
316  
The 
CFPB, FTC, and FCC already have sophisticated software for analyzing their 
own complaints for trends.
317 
They could presumably use that software to 
identify concerning complaint trends more rapidly, and thus provide better 
aggregate redress in the absence of class actions. For example, metrics such as 
 
 
 
 
 
 
314. See supra Section II.B.4. 
315. See Huba, supra note 174. 
316. Telephone Interview with S.N. (May 28, 2015). 
317. See supra note 291. 
 598 
Rory Van Loo, The Corporation as Courthouse, 33 YALE J. REG. 547 (2016). 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
post-complaint attrition rate and complaint rate per transaction could flag the 
need for heightened supervision when compared with industry peers.
318
 
Second, such a complaint network might become capable of flagging 
suspicious complaint behavior across intermediary platforms. For example, 
software with textual analysis could identify similar complaint language 
submitted from various IP addresses scattered throughout the world. Third, this 
meta-complaint database could improve complaint handling in markets lacking 
vigorous competition. It could do so by making it easier for consumers 
dissatisfied with the complaint process to attract regulators’ attention wherever 
they may complain. This would incentivize companies to pay more attention 
when a consumer reaches out with a dispute. 
Another consideration for better leveraging the informational power of 
complaints would simply be for regulators to improve how they process 
complaints submitted directly to them. The CFPB, as a new agency started in 
2011, has raised the bar for governmental complaint processing by following 
up with companies to check whether they adequately resolve complaints and by 
posting complaints online.
319 
The preliminary evidence is that this has had a 
beneficial  impact  on  financial  institutions’  internal  complaint  handling 
systems.
320 
Other agencies with a mandate to process complaints, such as the 
FTC, could follow suit. It may not be fair to expect the FTC to reach the same 
level of complaint handling as the CFPB because the agencies have different 
mandates and resources. The FTC’s historical complaint resolution rate of close 
to fifty percent however—to the extent it is comparable to the CFPB’s ninety- 
three percent rate—may indicate substandard performance.
321 
Intergovernmental agency metrics comparing complaint-handling rates, 
whether done by the White House or by congressional inquiry, could prod the 
FTC toward the CFPB’s performance levels. 
Both of these paths involve costs. Resources devoted to complaint 
processing are diverted from other functions, such as enforcement and 
supervision.
322 
There are also risks in giving too much power to consumer 
complaints, leading to inefficient levels  of complaint handling. Moreover, 
agencies’ efforts to produce digital tools would face obstacles given firms’ 
 
 
 
318. The idea would be to establish a yardstick. Cf. Ian Ayres & Amy Kapczynski, 
Innovation Sticks: The Limited Case for Penalizing Failures to Innovate, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1781 
(2015) (describing how a regulatory system of yardstick penalties could advance policy). 
319. See supra Section III.A.3. 
320. See id. 
321. See CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (Fall 2014), Semi Annual Report 2, 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201501_cfpb_semi-annual-report-fall-2014.pdf (reporting companies 
responded to over ninety-three percent of forwarded complaints, with another four percent under 
review); Porter, supra note 49, at 83 (explaining that about half of all FTC complaints have historically 
been resolved, meaning the regulator intervened or received assurance that the complaint was handled 
by the company). 
322. See Porter, supra note 49, at 84 (discussing the tradeoff between processing 
complaints and other regulatory functions). 
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great technological resources.
323 
These and other costs would need to be 
weighed closely. However, much of governmental complaint processing is 
automated, as is the submission of complaints in the private sector. It is thus 
quite possible that efficient ways of linking public and private complaints, and 
of processing governmental complaints, are worthy of experimentation. 
 
C. Sunrise Class Actions 
 
The CFPB is currently weighing whether to prevent financial institutions 
from using mandatory arbitration clauses, thereby reinstating class actions.
324 
The discussion above suggests that a legal system with widespread class action 
availability may not benefit consumers in markets in which the private legal 
system and regulators are functioning well. At the same time, class actions 
could improve dispute resolution in markets that lack those features.
325 
The 
CFPB has strong mechanisms in place to guard against under-resourcing and 
capture, but these safeguards have their limits and other relevant agencies have 
a weaker institutional design.
326 
Because regulation alone will often prove 
inadequate, it is worth considering how to make class actions available only in 
the face of evidence of market failures and regulatory inaction.
327 
These could 
be termed “sunrise class actions,”
328 
in contrast to the sunset clauses that end 
after a certain time period. For example, the U.S. Constitution states that 
appropriations for military operations must last no longer than two years.
329
 
In a sense, sunrise class actions are a regulatory approach aimed at 
“inducing attorneys to mimic the results that a healthy, functioning market for 
 
 
 
323. See generally Rory Van Loo, Rise of the Digital Regulator, 66 DUKE L.J. 
(forthcoming 2017) (outlining challenges facing administrative agencies’ use of digital tools). 
324. See Emma Gallimore, Attorney Expects CFPB To Release New Arbitration 
Rules this Year, LEGALNEWSLINE, Mar. 14, 2016, http://legalnewsline.com/stories/510698672-attorney 
-expects-cfpb-to-release-new-arbitration-rules-this-year. 
325. Cf. Samuel Issacharoff, Class Actions and State Authority, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 
369, 389 (2012) (“At present, it is precisely where public enforcement is difficult, compromised, 
captured, or under-resourced that the flexibility and the entrepreneurial drive behind the class action are 
most decisive and most significant.”). 
326. See Barkow, supra note 274, at 16-18 (articulating aspects of the CFPB’s 
institutional design that insulate it from capture and distinguishing those features from other agencies); 
Braucher & Littwin, supra note 272, at 810-812 (explaining the risk of CFPB capture as well as 
statutory and institutional factors that may enable the agency to resist capture). 
327. Other anti-capture measures are also worth considering, such as linking 
regulators’ pay to performance. See M. Todd Henderson & Frederick Tung, Pay for Regulator 
Performance, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1003, 1007 (2012). 
328. The concept of sunrise clauses is commonly discussed in constitutional law, 
denoting a clause that would become activated after a certain time period. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, 
AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 474-75 (2012) 
(arguing the framers should have used more sunrise clauses); Daniel E. Herz-Roiphe & David Singh 
Grewal, Make Me Democratic, But Not Yet: Sunrise Lawmaking and Democratic Constitutionalism, 90 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1975,  1979 (2015)  (exploring sunrise lawmaking); Sofia  Ranchordas, Innovation 
Experimentalism, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. (2015) (discussing how time-limited clauses can be 
balanced with innovation in regulation). 
329. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. 
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legal services would produce.”
330 
Developing a set of criteria that would trigger 
class action availability requires further study, although a robust literature 
aimed at reining in class actions provides a strong foundation for developing 
these criteria.
331 
Three categories of filters are particularly relevant. First, in 
certifying a class action, judges could look for signs of market failure such as a 
high industry concentration and high rate of consumer complaints. Second, the 
current ninety-day  period  mandated  by  the Class Action  Fairness Act for 
ensuring that relevant agencies—which means the Attorney General at the 
federal level—are notified could be used more proactively to determine 
whether federal consumer agencies will act on the issue, thus avoiding 
duplicative efforts.
332 
Third, the decision as to whether to make class actions 
available might be informed by the institutional design of agencies in a 
particular industry. Institutional features such as independent funding and the 
ease of removing the agency head, as well an analysis of historical funding 
levels, are factors that policy makers can weigh.
333
 
Scholars have constructed mechanisms that could be seen as sunrise class 
actions, although not designed for that purpose. For example, to provide 
aggregate redress under a mandatory arbitration regime, Professors Miriam 
Gilles and Gary Friedman have proposed that attorneys general could leverage 
the private bar to bring class action suits on behalf of consumers. Private-sector 
attorneys would litigate the cases under the attorney general’s powers, thus 
circumventing any contractual prohibition of class actions.
334 
This proposal 
puts the attorney general in a “litigation gatekeeper” role.
335 
More broadly, 
attorneys general, or under-resourced consumer agencies, could decide when 
markets have failed or regulation is inadequate, and then could partner with 
plaintiffs’ firms to create a form of sunrise class actions. 
Several limitations are worth considering. Sunrise class actions may work 
less well for some problems, such as racial discrimination in the 
marketplace.
336 
Such cases might not be adequately policed by reputation-based 
 
 
330. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing 
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mechanisms and vigorous regulation, due to the potential for minority voices to 
be drowned out.
337 
This would suggest that some categories of suits should be 
widely available and not subject to the additional restrictions of sunrise class 
actions. 
More broadly, sunrise class actions might prove costly and difficult to 
administer. Increased costs would come from requiring additional litigation to 
obtain certification. Difficulties in administration would result, for example, 
from the inevitable disagreement among economists about what evidence 
establishes market failures, and what conditions are necessary to establish 
sufficient competition. This disagreement makes it difficult to weigh such 
criteria.
338
 
These are not trivial concerns. Nor is the alternative particularly attractive: 
either allowing class actions as blunt instruments even when regulators would 
do the job better, or the absence of class actions even when regulators fail. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The private ordering of consumer disputes relies on a complex system. 
The arbitration tribunal is one actor in this system. Yet for most disputes, the 
arbitral tribunal—like the public courthouse—is not an option. Instead, the 
consumer-facing corporation provides the institutional framework for 
contractual settlement, adjudication, and enforcement. 
Much is unknown about this private consumer legal system. Accordingly, 
this Article does not seek to provide a definitive account. However, based on 
limited data there is cause for both optimism and concern. In some contexts, the 
corporation as the de facto courthouse is more responsive to consumers’ basic 
procedural preferences and provides greater substantive redress for a larger 
number of people than can arbitration tribunals or public courts. At the same 
time, behind a veil of trade secrecy corporations’ dispute systems exploit 
market failures and use unequal rules of procedure. 
It is possible that private actors such as startups will develop innovative 
solutions to address evolving dispute resolution pitfalls. For now, however, the 
key procedural decisions happen where only regulators can practically look— 
inside the corporation. It is thus worth asking whether administrative agencies 
should use their authority to at least diagnose the heart of the consumer legal 
system. More importantly, this Article’s analysis indicates the need to examine 
a broader set of interconnected institutions, and highlights new questions with 
great social significance. 
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This perspective has implications well beyond monetary disputes. An 
individual’s credit report can determine the ultimate outcome for an apartment 
rental, mortgage qualification, or job. Yet three companies control the credit 
report market, and have established flawed dispute resolution procedures for 
correcting even egregious errors on peoples’ credit reports. Comcast and 
YouTube regularly stop their own consumers from downloading or posting 
videos that other large corporations, such as Disney, argue violate intellectual 
property  law.
339  
Companies  such  as  Twitter  and  Reddit  are  policing  hate 
speech, spam, and bullying.
340 
In diverse contexts, research into the 
corporation’s rapidly expanding quasi-judicial role would illuminate not only 
the state of consumer rights, but also what procedural interventions society 
truly needs. 
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